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SEX IN THE CITY 
Sean Hannon Williams* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores a radical idea at the intersection of family law 
and local government law.  It outlines the surprisingly strong case for 
allowing local governments a voice in the dispute-resolution function 
of family law.  Under the existing intrastate distribution of power 
within family law, states set broad policies but delegate enormous 
discretion to individual judges to implement those policies as they see 
fit in individual cases.  This distribution of power is commonly 
criticized because it eviscerates predictability and allows a host of 
biases to infect judicial decisions.  This Article offers an alternate 
distribution of power, where cities can insert themselves between the 
state and the judge by providing guidance about whether, in that city, 
free range parenting is generally considered harmful to children or 
whether, in that city, adultery should trigger a disproportionate award 
of marital property to the innocent spouse. Such local rules of thumb 
have the potential to mitigate one of the most intractable problems 
within family law: how to cabin judicial discretion and make family 
law more rule-like in the absence of widespread agreement on mid- or 
even high-level policy goals.  More generally, local family law opens 
up avenues for much-needed policy experimentation, facilitates 
political entrepreneurship, and has the potential to reinvigorate 
citizen engagement with local politics. Properly structured, local 
                                                                                                            
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. This Article is part of a larger 
project at the intersection of local government law and family law. This larger 
project, and portions of this Article, have benefitted greatly from the insightful 
comments of Kerry Abrams, Lynn Baker, June Carbone, Maxine Eichner, Joseph 
Fishkin, William Forbath, Jill Hasday, Carissa Hessick, Clare Huntington, Ethan 
Leib, Daniel Rodriguez, Nadav Shoked, and Richard Schragger. Thanks also to 
participants at the Southwest Law Faculty Conference, the Emerging Family Law 
Scholars Conference, the International Academy for the Study of the Jurisprudence 
of the Family Conference, and participants in law school faculty colloquia at St. Louis 
University, the University of Virginia, and Georgetown. Most importantly, thanks to 
the participants at Fordham’s Cooper-Walsh Colloquium and the editors of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal. 
1108 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
 
family law can accomplish all of this without creating a serious risk of 
races to the bottom, forum shopping, externalities, or minority 
oppression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Failure to Flourish, Clare Huntington offers a compelling vision 
for the future of family law.  The traditional core of family law needs 
to be restructured to help ensure that children’s relationships with 
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their parents remain strong, stable, and positive.1  Additionally, 
institutions outside of the traditional core of family law—like zoning 
boards—should also be attentive to these policy concerns.2  
Huntington’s vision calls for reforms at the local, state, and federal 
level.  This Article focuses on the local level and explores a radical 
proposal: cities3 should have the power to weigh in on issues even 
within the very heart of family law—divorce and child custody. 
Some local efforts to influence family law have already been 
documented.  For example, many cities have used their home rule 
authority to create local domestic partner registries.4  Several cities—
most notably San Francisco—tried unsuccessfully to create local 
variation in marriage license requirements by issuing licenses to same-
sex couples.5  This Article moves beyond marriage and turns localist 
scholarly attention toward local regulation of family dissolution and 
the regulation of families more broadly.6 
The dominant narrative of family law is that it is created and 
maintained at the state level.  This narrative ignores the actual 
content of state family law.7  Although states set out the broad policy 
                                                                                                            
 1. CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS xvi, 80, 83 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 58, 99, 184. 
 3. For ease of exposition, I use the term “city” to refer to a host of general-
purpose local governments that include cities and townships.  I use the term “city 
council” to describe the legislative arms of these local governments. LYNN A. BAKER 
& CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 46 (4th 
ed. 2010). Although the term city may evoke visions of large metropolises, most cities 
are small and might be more aptly called suburbs or towns. See Richard Briffault, 
Our Localism: Part II, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 348 (1990). 
 4. June Carbone, Marriage as a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the 
Expressive Interest in Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49, 75 (2011). 
 5. Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148 (2005). 
 6. Sarah Swann addresses local ordinances that have an indirect effect on 
families, and sometimes have the indirect effect on cleaving those families apart. 
Sarah Swann, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L. J. 823 (2015).  Her discussion focuses on local 
landlord tenant laws rather than family law; she does not discuss divorce or the 
possibility that cities could regulate the family more directly. Id. 
 7. This narrative also ignores the surprisingly robust role that the federal 
government has played in family law. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: 
The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2005) (citing several examples of federal family law, 
including immigration, welfare, war pensions, pre-civil war federal court jurisdiction, 
and 120 proposed family law amendments to the federal constitution between 1880 
and 1929); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 872-
73 (2004). 
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goals of family law, they delegate enormous discretion to trial court 
judges to implement those policies as they see fit in individual cases.  
Because the state’s policies are so broad—for example, judges are 
asked to split marital property in an “equitable” manner and are 
asked to do what is in the child’s “best interests”—family law is 
largely created at the level of the individual judge.8  This has 
implications for the doctrines that police the boundary between local 
and state authority.  Arguably, many cities already have the power to 
initiate legislation in this area, and they can do so in ways that avoid 
existing intrastate preemption doctrine.  Cities may have more power 
over family affairs than scholars have previously acknowledged.  
Regardless, a surprisingly strong case can be made that they should 
have more power. 
Creating space for a uniquely local voice has the potential to create 
two distinct sets of benefits.  First, city power can accomplish what 
decades of reform efforts have failed to achieve: to alleviate the 
problems with, and open up a more productive dialogue about, family 
law’s open-ended standards.  Second, local family law is uniquely 
situated to fulfill the promise of local government law more generally 
without incurring the costs that traditionally accompany local power. 
Family law’s open-ended standards ensure that intrastate variation 
is endemic to divorce law.9  Some judges think that viewing 
pornography in private is probative of parental fitness.10  Others do 
not.11  Depending on the specific judge assigned to their case, gay 
parents could lose custody for engaging in public displays of affection 
with their partner.12  Ironically, gay parents who are wary of this 
possibility could find themselves in front of a different judge and lose 
custody for not showing enough affection to their partners.13  This 
unpredictability infects monetary decisions as well.  According to 
                                                                                                            
 8. See generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). 
 9. These open-ended standards control property division, alimony, and child 
custody. Although custody is decided predominately based on one factor—the best 
interests of the child—that factor is protean enough to effectively be an open-ended 
invitation to consider a near infinite number of factors. 
 10. See Petty v. Petty, 2005 WL 1183149, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing 
trial court order that allowed father with “penchant for pornography” to exercise his 
overnight co-parenting time only in the grandparent’s house with them present). 
 11. See id. (overturning the trial court’s order). 
 12. Suzanne Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 33 (2012). 
 13. Id. at 42 (citing Uvland v. Uvland, 2000 WL 33407372, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 22, 2000)). 
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some judges, a stay-at-home mom deserves to be compensated for her 
sacrifices.14  But according to others, a stay-at-home mom should get 
a job and learn to support herself after a divorce.15 
Existing reform proposals—Huntington’s included—seek to rulify 
family law’s open-ended standards.  That is, they attempt to convince 
state legislatures or state appellate courts to provide more concrete 
guidance to trial courts.16  Unfortunately, these proposals have been 
uniformly ignored, in large part because of political stalemate at the 
state level.  This Article explores the possibility of local rather than 
state reform.  Local rulification can accomplish much of what 
reformers have been seeking.17 
This Article offers an initial defense of a mild form of local 
rulification.18  Although its conclusions are necessarily preliminary, 
this Article argues that cities should be able to guide judges as they 
exercise the broad discretion that the state has provided them.  At 
most, cities would be able to require local judges to consider local 
judgments.19  These rules of thumb20 would provide non-binding 
advice to judges about how to exercise the discretion that the state 
has given them.  They would tell the judge what, in that locality, 
constitutes an equitable monetary award for a stay-at-home parent, or 
                                                                                                            
 14. See generally Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2011). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 124-26. 
 17. I do not suggest that reformers should ignore state legislatures. Reforms at the 
state level occur occasionally. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5–a) 
(McKinney 2016). 
 18. For a broader discussion of localism and family law reform, see two 
companion pieces. Sean Hannon Williams, Divorce All the Way Down: Local Voice 
and Family Law’s Democratic Deficit (U. Tex. L., Pub. L. Research Paper), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955198 (discussing the potential role of cities, school 
boards, and groups of local judges) [hereinafter Williams, Local Voice]; Sean Hannon 
Williams, Wild Flowers in the Swamp: Local Rules and Family Law (U. Tex. L., Pub. 
L. Research Paper No. 670), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955202 (discussing local court 
rules that address substantive matters rather than procedural ones). 
 19. Of course, this would require that state judges interpret local power and state 
preemption doctrines in ways that allow this form of influence.  See infra Part III for 
a full discussion. 
 20. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 4-6, 108-09 
(1991).  Rules of thumb do not exert any influence beyond the reasons undergirding 
them.  They influence decisions only when there is uncertainty—they guide judges 
toward one outcome within a larger set of possible reasonable outcomes.  Even if a 
judge has some idea that another outcome is best, rules of thumb can elevate the 
level of certainty or confidence the judge needs to deviate from the outcome 
indicated by the rule of thumb. Id. 
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whether, in that locality, spanking is an acceptable means of 
disciplining children.  Although these advisory rules of thumb have 
limited teeth, many judges desperately seek out advice to help guide 
the paralyzingly broad discretion that the state gives them.  Other 
jurisdictions that have experimented with advisory rules of thumb 
have confirmed that they have a surprisingly large amount of 
influence.21 
Although merely advisory, local influence over family law shares 
many of the benefits of local power more broadly.22  Properly 
structured, local power over divorce and child custody can facilitate 
much-needed policy experimentation, political entrepreneurship, and 
participation.23  An ordinance in Berkeley might require judges to 
consider a local judgment that helicopter parenting is generally 
harmful to children.  San Jose might come to the opposite conclusion.  
Even if only a few cities experiment, a host of organizations will 
attempt to assess those experiments so that both the state and other 
cities can learn from them.24  City councilmembers can also act as 
political entrepreneurs and force the state to debate issues that it 
would rather avoid.  A Houston ordinance proclaiming that parents 
who host overnight guests should rarely get custody could force the 
state legislature to debate the issue when deciding whether to 
preempt the ordinance.  Finally, local power over family law issues 
has a unique potential to rekindle the often-ridiculed communitarian 
benefits of local government.25  Of all the things that local 
government might do, family law is one of a select few that are likely 
to spur significant and sustained citizen engagement. 
Of course, local power is not unequivocally positive, but the 
common negative effects of local power are either absent or can be 
easily managed in the context of local rules of thumb.26  Municipal 
power will not lead to races to the bottom or externalities on other 
cities.  Forum shopping, while theoretically possible, faces a number 
of practical obstacles and, regardless, can be easily policed.  Although 
local law is normally associated with decreased uniformity, local 
family law turns this traditional analysis on its head.  Open-ended 
family law standards create judge-by-judge variation that has the 
                                                                                                            
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. Part II outlines these claims in detail. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See infra notes 139 and 140 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
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effect of creating widespread disuniformity.  Moving some aspects of 
family law to the local level can dramatically increase uniformity.  
The advisory nature of local rules of thumb radically decreases the 
likelihood that city councils would be able to oppress local minorities, 
as do a set of existing constitutional doctrines that create substantial 
barriers to singling out people for different treatment.27  Ordinances 
would not be able to say that the lighter skinned member of an 
interracial couple should generally get custody, or that mothers 
should generally get custody, or that the Christian member of an 
interfaith couple should generally get custody.  This constrained 
capacity to harm stands in stark contrast to the important benefits 
that localism can provide in this area. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I introduces family law’s 
open-ended standards and their common critiques.  Part II illustrates 
the promise of local power over divorce and other family law matters.  
Part III discusses doctrinal obstacles to local family law, paying 
special attention to cities’ initiative power and preemption concerns.  
Part IV briefly examines six objections to shifting power to the local 
level—races to the bottom, forum shopping, externalities, 
disuniformity, incompetence, and the possibility of oppressing local 
minorities.  Finally, the conclusion argues that reformers of almost all 
stripes should seriously consider the potential benefits of local rules 
of thumb.  Counterintuitively, even those who favor more 
centralization and greater federal control over family law have reason 
to support the form of localism that this Article defends. 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
As Huntington rightly notes, the dispute resolution branch of 
family law often intervenes in a manner that makes things worse.28  
Huntington cites two primary culprits: the all-or-nothing character of 
the dispute resolution system and its adversarial nature.29 
The all-or-nothing character of family law’s dispute resolution is 
not so much a matter of its legal directives, but of how people 
perceive them.  Courts may grant custody to one parent and visitation 
to another.  This promotes the perception that one parent has won 
and the other has lost.  In Texas, judges often award parents “joint 
                                                                                                            
 27. See infra, Part IV.D. 
 28. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 115. 
 29. Id. 
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managing conservatorship.”30  The court then gives one joint 
conservator the power to determine the child’s primary residence and 
gives the other the right to possess the child at certain times.31  
Substantively, this is the same as granting one parent physical custody 
and the other visitation, but the nomenclature puts a different—and 
arguably more beneficial—spin on it.32 
The adversarial nature of the system also promotes conflict, which 
in turn undermines the ability of parents to work together as co-
parents after a split.  But the adversarial structure of litigation is not 
entirely to blame for its adversarial nature. The substantive law also 
contributes to the adversarial nature of family law disputes.  For 
example, custody is primarily determined by reference to the best 
interests of the child.  This substantive rule creates incentives for each 
parent to attack and denigrate the other’s parental abilities.33  This is 
hardly a recipe for rebuilding the already strained relationship of the 
parents. 
Perhaps most importantly, the substance of the law contributes to 
excessive and overly acrimonious litigation because the legal 
directives embedded within family law’s dispute resolution system are 
overwhelmingly open-ended standards rather than concrete rules.  
Upon divorce, courts are called upon to divide the couple’s existing 
assets and determine alimony.  Regardless of their marital status, if 
the couple had children, the court must determine child support and 
define the detailed parameters of physical and legal custody.  Of these 
tasks, all but one relies on open-ended standards.34  These open-
ended standards suffer from the classic virtues and vices that are often 
attributed to standards.  On the virtue side, family law’s open-ended 
standards give judges the power to adjust their rulings to the unique 
                                                                                                            
 30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134 (West 2016). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE §§ 6-8 (2d ed. 2012) 
(noting that “the term joint custody can act as a placebo even if the reality is just a 
standard custody/visitation”). 
 33. HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 89, 131 (“[W]hen the parents do not need to 
tear each other down to get their desired outcome, the parents are in a much better 
position to co-parent.”). 
 34. Child support is the only outlier.  All states use formulas to presumptively 
determine child support.  Notably, this innovation was not introduced by the states, 
but mandated by Congress as part of welfare reforms.  Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667); 
Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485 (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667). 
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facts present in each case.35  But the bulk of scholarly attention has 
focused on their vices.36  Much of this work discusses family law’s 
child custody standard—the best interests of the child.  This standard 
is uniformly disparaged.37  Generally, open-ended standards create 
two related problems.  First, at the beginning of the litigation process, 
these standards make it nearly impossible to predict the outcome.  
Second, at the end of the litigation process, they set the perfect stage 
for litigants to subsequently view the outcomes as illegitimate.  Each 
of these features of the current system tends to undermine the ability 
of parents to maintain a positive relationship after judicial 
intervention. 
A. Ex Ante Unpredictability 
Family law’s open-ended standards make the outcome of family 
law cases unpredictable.38  Although there is some evidence that 
mothers obtain custody in greater numbers than fathers,39 custody 
determinations are so multifaceted40 that they are impossible to 
predict.41  Because parents cannot predict which arguments will carry 
the day, they are incentivized to mount an all-out assault on the other 
parent’s fitness.  Judicial decisions regarding property division and 
alimony are also unpredictable, and can promote lengthy litigation 
about the relative contributions that each spouse made to the 
                                                                                                            
 35. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985). 
 36. For a recent overview of these criticisms, see Steven N. Peskind, Determining 
the Undeterminable: the Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but 
Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 457-64 
(2005). 
 37. See generally A.L.I, supra note 8, at 2. 
 38. Katherine Baker, Homogeneous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The 
Standardization of Family Law when there is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 319, 331, 337. 
 39. JAMES DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 42 (2006).  Other 
estimates suggest that mothers and fathers win in equal proportions, which might just 
suggest that litigants accurately adjust to judicial biases and only litigate close cases. 
Stanford L. Braver, Jeffrey T. Cookston & Bruce R. Cohen, Experiences of Family 
Law Attorneys with Current Issues in Divorce Practice, 51 FAM. REL. 325, 327-28, 
330 (2002). 
 40. In addition to determining the primary custodian, judges must determine 
precisely how much time the other parent can spend with the child, and under 
precisely what set of conditions and circumstances. 
 41. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 32, at § 4-1 (“Cases with very similar facts 
may be decided in divergent ways by courts of different states, and even by courts 
within the same state.  The differing results often come from the hearts and emotions 
of judges, rather than from the facts of the case.”). 
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marriage.  Courts are directed to make an equitable division of the 
assets and award a reasonable amount of maintenance.42  These 
courts are then given long lists of relevant factors that, in practice, 
offer no help to litigants who want to predict how their case will come 
out.43 
Although many judges stick close to a fifty-fifty division of marital 
property, researchers have found it impossible to predict when judges 
will deviate from equal splits.44  In one study of alimony, none of the 
statutory factors that judges were supposed to consult correlated with 
their decisions to award permanent alimony.45  In a recent study, lay 
people addressing the same set of facts awarded between $0 and 
$19,000 in annual alimony payments.46  When judges in Ohio were 
asked how much alimony a lifelong homemaker married to a doctor 
deserved, they gave estimates ranging from $5000 to $175,000 per 
year.47 
                                                                                                            
 42. Only nine states split marital property evenly or have a presumption in favor 
of doing so.  The rest give courts wide discretion to split those assets equitably. 
Baker, supra note 38, at 334. 
 43. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (West 2016) (“In determining 
whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the 
court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the 
length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or 
legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, 
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each 
of the parties”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 2016) (“The court shall divide all 
property,  . . .  equitably between the parties after considering all of the following: a. 
The length of the marriage. b. The property brought to the marriage by each party. c. 
The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to 
each party’s contribution in homemaking and child care services. d. The age and 
physical and emotional health of the parties. e. The contribution by one party to the 
education, training, or increased earning power of the other. f. The earning capacity 
of each party  . . . .  i. Other economic circumstances of each party  . . .  . m. Other 
factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case.”). 
 44. See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What’s Needed and What’s Not, 27 
PACE L. REV. 921, 927 (2007) [hereinafter Reforming Divorce]; Marsha Garrison, 
How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary 
Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 431 (1996). The best indicator of these 
lopsided awards was family violence. Garrison, supra, at 464. 
 45. Garrison, supra note 44, at 489. 
 46. Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford Braver, Lay Intuitions about Family Obligations: 
The Case of Alimony, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 209, 225 (2012). 
 47. Alexandra Harwin, Ending the Alimony Guessing Game, N.Y. TIMES OP. ED., 
(Jul. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/opinion/04harwin.html. This 
variation should not be surprising given that alimony presents a translation problem: 
no one knows how to translate admiration (for a dutiful homemaker) or outrage (for 
an adulterous lout) into dollars. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent 
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This unpredictability creates fertile ground for self-serving biases 
to skew each spouse’s determination of what settlement is fair and 
what settlement is likely.48  This hinders settlement and increases the 
likelihood of litigation, which is just about the only thing that people 
agree is not in the best interest of children.49 
Of course, there are some small islands of predictability.  For 
example, a judge’s political party and education appear to influence 
some alimony determinations.50  But this points to the second 
problem with family law’s open-ended standards: litigants are likely 
to believe that the outcome of their case was dictated by the judge’s 
personal bias or other illegitimate factors. 
B. Ex Post Illegitimacy 
Judges have no way to decide most custody cases other than resort 
to their personal biases and beliefs.51  The best interests standard has 
a long and unfortunate history of being used to deny gay parents 
custody, to deny people with disabilities custody, to police women’s 
post-divorce sexuality, and to reinforce traditional gender roles.52  A 
                                                                                                            
Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1169 (2002) (discussing this translation problem in 
the context of punitive damages). 
 48. See generally Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining 
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 109 (1997). 
 49. Hence, some scholars have entertained the possibility of adjudicating child 
custody by flipping a coin. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 226, 289-91 (1975). Judges who have actually used this method have been 
subjected to reversal and disciplinary action. Benjamin Shmueli, Civil Actions for 
Acts That are Valid According to Religious Family Law but Harm Women’s Rights: 
Legal Pluralism in Cases of Collision between Two Sets of Laws, 46 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 823, 836 n.40 (2013).  Once in litigation, open-ended standards also 
increase the importance of good attorneys and the money to pay for them, undermine 
the principle that like cases should be treated alike, and systematically favor the less 
risk-averse spouse. Peskind, supra note 36, at 464; Schneider, infra note 51, at 2274; 
see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 978-80 (1979). 
 50. Peskind, supra note 36, at 486-87.  The binary decision about whether to 
award alimony was more predictable. Id. at 486.  But regional variation appeared. Id. 
at 469-70, 481. 
 51. Of course, a judge’s power is not entirely unbounded. The best interests of the 
child standard excludes some considerations. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, 
Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA’s Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 2215, 2252-59 (1991). 
 52. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 701-04, 707 (4th ed. 2010); see Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination in Custody Cases, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 877, 
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study of Indiana judges in 1998 is particularly illuminating.53  It 
revealed that more than half of the judges expressed support for the 
tender years doctrine—a now-publically-disavowed presumption that 
mothers should obtain custody of young children.54  A few stated that, 
although they could not admit to their beliefs publically, they thought 
that mothers were more “natural” caregivers and had better 
“instincts.”55  Another said he always gave custody to the mother 
“assuming she’s not nuts.”56 
Judicial beliefs correlated with actual custody decisions.  In cases 
where one child was six or under, judges that supported the tender 
years doctrine gave custody to mothers more than judges who 
rejected the doctrine.57  When the children were seven or older, there 
were no differences between the two sets of judges.58  This pattern—
inter-judge variation alongside some intra-judge predictability—is 
precisely the pattern one would expect if personal beliefs were 
infecting the best interests standard.  More recent evidence paints the 
same picture.  For example, one California judge publically stated in 
2004 that he never allowed custodial parents to relocate, even though 
the controlling state precedent at the time cautioned judges against 
second guessing a custodial parent’s decision to move.59 
Although today’s judges may harbor more implicit than explicit 
biases, the result is the same.  Litigants suspect that their case was 
decided based on illegitimate factors.  This is likely to foster 
bitterness both toward the judge and toward the other parent.  After 
all, in the eyes of the disgruntled parent, the other parent used the 
                                                                                                            
882-86 (2000); Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights 
of Parents with Disabilities and their Children (2012). 
 53. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the 
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 769, 780, 784 (2004). 
 54. Id. at 783. 
 55. Id. at 780, 84. 
 56. Id. at 786. 
 57. Id. at 795. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Carol S. Bruch, The Use of Unpublished Opinions on Relocation Law by 
California Courts, in LIBER MEMORIALIS PETAR SARCEVIS: UNIVERSALISM, 
TRADITION, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 234 n.40 (J. Erauw et al. eds., 2006).  For more 
evidence of inter-judge variability, but this time among state supreme court judges, 
see Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of 
Judicial Gender, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 923, 936 (2004) (finding that “[f]emale 
justices supported female litigants 75.6% of the time while male justices supported 
female litigants 53.6% of the time.”). 
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judge’s biased holding to steal the kids and perhaps the family money 
as well. 
C. Existing Reform Proposals: Rulification 
“Among those who live and work in the world of family law 
obligation, there is a yearning for predictability and efficiency.  
Context is expensive and invasive.”60 
 
“To call this kind of discretionary grant an ‘equitable discretion’ 
law is like calling the MX missile a ‘peacekeeper.’  Its authors may 
hope for that result, but it has great potential to do the opposite.”61 
*       *       * 
Existing reform proposals—Huntington’s included—seek to rulify 
family law’s open-ended standards.62  Of course, rulification is not the 
only goal.  Not all rules will help foster strong, stable, positive 
relationships.  A rule that totally cut off one parent from seeing their 
child would certainly not do so, nor would a rule that left custodial 
parents so poor that they had to take second jobs and hence they 
were not able to spend quality time with their children.  But there is 
an extraordinarily wide range of rules that would offer improvements 
on the current system, in part because rules—regardless of their 
content—decrease the number of things to fight about, and it is 
precisely the adversarial fighting that does the most damage to 
parents’ ongoing relationship with one another. 
Huntington’s first proposal is to adopt something akin to Elizabeth 
Scott’s or the ALI’s approximation rule.63  Under this rule, post-
dissolution parenting time does not depend on the whims of a biased 
judge.  Rather, it depends on ascertainable facts.  Post-dissolution 
custody reflects the pre-dissolution child-care arrangement between 
the parents.  So if the court finds that the mother was responsible for 
seventy percent of the care before the split, then she would get 
seventy percent of the parenting time after the split.64  This rule 
makes custody determinations more predictable, which in turn 
                                                                                                            
 60. Baker, supra note 38, at 320. 
 61. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family 
Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1986). 
 62. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 124-26 (describing proposals by the ALI 
and endorsing some of them). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See A.L.I, supra note 8, at § 2.08. 
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reduces litigation.65  Huntington rightly concludes that this rule would 
be a vast improvement over the current system,66 at least in terms of 
reducing litigation, improving predictability, and decreasing the 
likelihood that parents will come away feeling like the outcome was 
the result of illegitimate judicial bias.67 
Huntington is less committed to any one proposal in the context of 
spousal maintenance.  Nonetheless, she offers qualified praise for the 
ALI’s model rule, at least insofar as it would reduce acrimony.68  It 
would do so primarily by virtue of the fact that it relies more on rules 
than standards.69 
Rulification is the common thread that runs through almost all 
proposals to reform family law’s dispute resolution system, regardless 
of their political valence.  Many scholars and judges have argued that 
states should adopt a primary caretaker presumption, under which a 
judge would presumptively award custody to the child’s primary 
caretaker.70  Fathers’ rights groups have consistently sought a 
presumption in favor of joint physical custody.71  Men’s rights groups 
more broadly have sought to implement a rule that would cut off 
                                                                                                            
 65. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
 66. Id. at 125. 
 67. Huntington also touts the rule because it channels the parents’ fighting into a 
less personal arena. Id. at 125.  Calling your partner a bad mother is perhaps more 
damaging to your co-parenting relationship than asserting that she was only 
responsible for 35% of the care.  But parents are likely to have plenty of ill will about 
who did what.  Many parents are bitter about unequal burdens of child care.  That 
bitterness makes assertions like “I did just as much as her!” quite personal, and quite 
offensive.  So although the proposed approximation rule may make matters more 
predictable, it might still leave ample opportunities to damage the future co-
parenting relationship. 
 68. See id. at 127-28. 
 69. As an additional bonus, the ALI rule would generally shift money to those 
with child custody. It does so because it is quite generous to the parent who 
undertook the bulk of the child care responsibilities prior to the split. A.L.I, supra 
note 8, at § 5.05. 
 70. See Glendon, supra note 61, at 1181-82. See generally R. NEELY, THE 
DIVORCE DECISION 14-16 (1984); David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules 
for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L REV. 477, 480-81 (1984); Martha 
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child 
Custody Decision-Making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 727-28 (1988). 
 71. See Jack Sampson, Choking on Statutes Revisited: A History of Legislative 
Preemption of Common Law Regarding Child Custody, 45 FAM. L. Q. 95, 105-06 
(2011); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: 
The Puzzling Persistence of the Best Interest Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 
(2014). See generally Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law Reform: 
Arizona’s Child Support Guidelines, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 148-49 (2012). 
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alimony when the obligor retires.72  More complex alliances of 
reformers have sought alimony formulas that determine the amount 
and/or duration of alimony.73 
These proposals have had very little success.74  Why have 
legislatures remained largely inactive in the face of widespread 
criticism of family law’s open-ended standards?  Stalemate at the 
state-level is a likely culprit.75  Many reform proposals have 
predictable, gendered impacts.76  For example, the primary caretaker 
presumption favors mothers over fathers.  These gendered impacts 
make altering the best interest standard especially unappealing to 
state legislatures77 and especially hard given that predictable 
legislative effects help mobilize interest groups.78  Reforming 
                                                                                                            
 72. Barry Nolan, Attack of the 50-Foot Feminist Agenda, BOS. MAG., Sept. 2012, 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2012/08/angry-men-feminist-agenda/. 
 73. See, e.g., id.; Beth Pinsker, Breadwinning Women Are Driving Alimony 
Reform, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-women-divorce-
alimony-idUSKCN0T61O920151117. 
 74. Minnesota and West Virginia are the only states that have adopted either the 
primary caretaker presumption or the ALI’s standard. See MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 518.17 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2003); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 
(Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).  Fathers’ rights 
groups have also largely failed to obtain a presumption in favor of joint physical 
custody. See ATKINSON, supra note 32, at § 4-1 (listing only two states—NM and 
LA—that have enacted presumptions in favor of joint physical custody); Scott & 
Emery, supra note 71, at 76. 
 75. A misplaced faith in custody evaluators and other mental health professionals 
may also contribute. Scott & Emery, supra note 71, at 71. 
 76. See id. at 2. 
 77. Sampson, supra note 71, at 106 (“It seems to many observers that avoiding 
controversy if at all possible is a central principle of the Texas Legislature.”); See 
Ellman, supra note 71, at 149 (describing ways that state actors attempt to avoid 
difficult policy questions). 
 78. See Ellman, supra note 71, at 177 (noting that interest groups that faced 
potential losses from a set of child support amendments appeared to be more 
aggressive than interest groups that faced potential gains, making change particularly 
difficult); Scott & Emery, supra note 71, at 76-77.  Some reforms can avoid 
potentially stalemate. As Barbara Stark and Jeffery Evans Stake have argued, states 
could mandate that spouses and parents opt-in to one of a potentially capacious set of 
pre-packaged family law rules. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 429-30 (1992); See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From 
One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1521 (2001). 
This may not have predictable gendered effects and creates the appearance of getting 
the informed consent from each participant.  But this reform requires substantial 
state action that has yet to occur. 
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property division or alimony would create similarly gendered 
effects.79 
Another major set of reform proposals argues that family law’s 
open-ended standards should be cabined through the process of 
common law—rather than legislative—rulemaking.80  Trial courts 
could be required to issue written opinions outlining their reasoning, 
and appellate courts could use those opinions to more aggressively 
guide trial-court discretion.81 
Unfortunately, appellate review today remains ineffectual.82  In 
1998, one Indiana judge said: “[R]ead the cases and find the number 
of child custody cases that are reversed . . . we can do just about 
anything we want to, and if the judge spends a little time writing it, 
whatever decision we make will be upheld on appeal.”83  In the early 
2000s, California practitioners reported that “because trial judges in 
family law cases realize that (as a practical matter) they are immune 
from appellate review, many decisions ignore the controlling law.”84 
Why is appellate review still ineffectual?  Overworked trial courts 
are likely hesitant to add to their workload by issuing detailed written 
opinions. Appellate courts, too, are unlikely to significantly increase 
their workload. Even if appellate judges had ample extra time, the 
lack of consensus on the relevant value judgments makes it likely that 
appellate courts, like state legislatures, would simply pass the buck on 
controversial issues to trial courts.  This is precisely what appellate 
courts in Alabama did after a member of the Alabama Supreme 
Court tried to inject Christian values into custody determinations.  
                                                                                                            
 79. For a host of reasons, husbands out-earn wives. Reforms of property division 
that, for example, seek to increase the importance of the spouses’ relative monetary 
contributions would systematically favor men. Similarly, because alimony transfers 
money from the higher earning spouse to the lower earning spouse, alimony reform 
has predictable gendered impacts. Despite this, a small number of state legislatures 
have been relatively active in alimony reform. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-
10-114; Mass. Stat. 208 § 49; Kathleen Haughney & Lisa Huriash, Alimony Law in 
Florida Changes Drastically Under New Bill, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-04-18/news/fl-alimony-changes-final-passage-
20130418_1_florida-alimony-reform-permanent-alimony-alimony-law. 
 80. See Peskind, supra note 36, at 479-80; Schneider, supra note 51, at 2290. 
 81. Schneider, supra note 51, at 2294. 
 82. Peskind, supra note 36, at 462 (noting that appellate review is still 
“emasculated”). 
 83. Artis, supra note 53, at 791 (quoting a judge’s statement during interview). 
 84. Bruch, supra note 59, at 230, 234 n.40. 
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Faced with this contentious issue, appellate courts dodged it and 
simply gave more deference to trial courts.85 
II.  LOCALISM’S PROMISE 
These reform failures suggest that reformers need to look beyond 
the state.  Here, Huntington’s broad focus helps bring other possible 
solutions into view.  For example, she invites zoning boards to take a 
more active role in shaping family relationships.86  Those boards can 
facilitate the construction of parks and playgrounds that benefit child 
development, and they can at least make modest contributions to 
reducing commute times which rob children of valuable parental 
interaction.87  On a higher level of generality, this discussion of zoning 
boards invites reformers to look to local governments.  This turns out 
to be a quite fruitful invitation.  Cities and other localities could, at 
least in part, fill the reform void at the state level. 
Local rulification comes with several benefits over state 
rulification.  Local governments are much more likely to avoid 
stalemate on contested family law issues.  Further, if local 
government officials believe that they have a role to play in the very 
heart of family law, even if it is a small one, they are much more likely 
to embrace Huntington’s plea that they consider family welfare across 
a range of issues, including housing, zoning, and anti-discrimination.88  
Local family law—whether in the form of rulification or otherwise—
could also have benefits common to other instances of local power, 
including policy experimentation, political entrepreneurship, 
participation, and efficient sorting.89  This Part briefly explores each 
                                                                                                            
 85. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 UMKC L. REV. 267, 
273 (2008). 
 86. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 23, 99, 184. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 23, 64-65, 99, 181-89. 
 89. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal 
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1312, 1314 (1994) 
(identifying the following values: innovation, participation, responsiveness, and 
checks on tyranny); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local 
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1024-25 (2007) 
(identifying the following values: experimentation, efficiency, participation, and 
checks on other power).  This Article sets aside issues of checking federal and state 
power because local family law can only operate within the bounds set by state law.  
This Article also sets aside non-instrumentalist arguments for local family law. See 
Davidson, supra, at 1008 n.218 (bracketing non-instrumentalist concerns); see also 
Briffault, supra, at 1303-05 (noting that federalism scholars have turned to 
instrumentalist arguments to defend federalism and arguing that the values ascribed 
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of these potential benefits.  Again, for ease of exposition, I refer to 
various local government units collectively as cities and their 
legislative arms as city councils.90 
A. Will Cities Innovate? 
There are several reasons to think that cities would be particularly 
attracted to legislating on family law matters.  Those areas have high 
expressive value and would reflect expansions in local power.  
Expressive and power-expanding ordinances have been quite popular 
recently.91  Thirteen cities have passed laws rejecting the FDA’s 
authority to regulate locally grown food.92  By the time the United 
States invaded Iraq, 170 localities had passed resolutions denouncing 
that possibility.93  There have been more than 400 resolutions 
opposing the PATRIOT Act.94  In direct contradiction of federal law, 
120 ordinances stipulate that local officials cannot report another’s 
immigration status to the federal government.95  The list goes on.  
During the 2000s, almost 300 cities engaged in some form of foreign 
policy activism.96  Cities have designated themselves nuclear free 
zones,97 and asserted that English is their official language.98  Many 
cities have a taste for expressive activism.99  Local family law fits this 
mold.  An ordinance might say that free range parenting is good for 
kids, or that delaying or refusing vaccinations is bad for children, or 
                                                                                                            
to federalism are largely the same as the values ascribed to allowing local 
governments to exercise power). 
 90. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 91. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 
253, 260 (2004) (“A review of recent home rule cases around the country provides 
striking evidence of the local willingness to experiment with new policies concerning 
public health and safety, individual rights, social welfare, political reform, and the 
private provision of public services.”). 
 92. LORI RIVERSTONE-NEWELL, RENEGADE CITIES, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF FEDERALISM 1 (2014). 
 93. Id. at 177. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. at 3, 151. 
 96. Id. at 177. 
 97. Id. at 176. In the 1980s, 220 localities passed resolutions against nuclear 
testing. Id. 
 98. Id. at 148. 
 99. Of course, some cities have engaged in more impactful activism. Id. at 115-16 
(discussing cities who issued same-sex marriage licenses); Paul Diller, Why Do Cities 
Innovate in Public Health, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1225, 1239 (2014) (discussing 
indoor smoking bans and the proliferation of New York City’s calorie disclosure 
requirements). 
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that children are generally harmed when they witness their parents 
entertaining new overnight guests, or that spanking is a reasonable 
means of disciplining a child.  Each of these ordinances connects with 
larger public debates, giving them particular expressive force. 
Local rulification is also cheap.100  An ordinance might require 
judges to consider the city’s judgment that the ALI’s approximation 
standard is the proper way to ensure that custody decisions are in the 
best interests of children.  Another ordinance might require judges to 
consider the local judgment that alimony should be no longer than 
three years.  These forms of local rulification do not take any money 
way from the town fisc.  Instead, they will likely save divorcing voters 
money on their attorney’s fees. 
The bargain price of local rulification stands in contrast to other 
ways in which cities might promote family welfare, such as through 
zoning or universal pre-K.  One set of possible reforms—including 
pre-K and nurse partnerships—requires direct expenditures.101  
Another set of reforms requires more indirect expenditures.  Zoning 
is a good example.  A city might require that developers install more 
sidewalks or build more playgrounds or plant more trees,102 but all of 
this costs money.  In the context of a new development, these 
expenses would simply get passed on to the people who choose to live 
there in the form of higher housing prices and higher rents.  Costing 
residents money may not be something elected officials are in a hurry 
to do.  In contrast to pre-K, nursing programs, and zoning, local 
                                                                                                            
 100. Of course, expressive ordinances might have political costs. RIVERSTONE-
NEWELL, supra note 92, at 168-69. 
 101. As Huntington notes, if localities are required to balance their budgets on an 
annual basis, her arguments about the long term cost savings of these programs may 
fall on deaf ears at the city level. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 215-16.  The 
federal government may therefore be the right target for these arguments rooted in 
cost benefit analysis.  Even if cities could engage in these long-term investments, it is 
not clear that cities could fully capture their positive effects.  If they operate as 
hoped, many young adults will be more mobile and may leave the locality.  Pre-K in 
New York City may later benefit the northern New Jersey suburbs.  Although cities 
can capture part of the benefit by having to provide services to fewer persons, they 
may not obtain the benefits of future tax dollars that more productive citizens 
generate.  This alters the cost-benefit analysis in ways that again favor reforms at the 
state or national level. 
 102. Each of these might facilitate community and parenting in its own way—
sidewalks create opportunities for neighbors to meet casually, playgrounds do the 
same while also providing a gathering area for children, trees provide shade, which as 
we know in Texas during the summer, is required to convince anyone to walk on the 
sidewalks or go to the playground. 
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rulification does not require the city or its citizens to incur any 
monetary costs. 
In addition to local family law’s high expressive value and low 
monetary cost, local governments are significantly less likely to 
experience the stalemate that reformers have seen at the state level.  
A state’s various cities are likely to be far more homogeneous than 
the state as a whole.  This is in part due to the statistical realities of 
taking small samples of the state’s population, and in part due to the 
selective sorting that takes place when people decide where to live.103  
While reformers at the state level have to carefully craft “purple” 
reforms that are acceptable to both red and blue voters,104 smaller 
political units are more likely to be either red or blue.  This increases 
the likelihood that the residents of at least some of the 36,000 
municipal and township units in the country105 will be able to avoid 
stalemate and agree on more rule-like justice in family law matters. 
Enacting local family law is, at least in some ways, a particularly 
good first step along the path to more robust consideration of family 
law matters at the local level.  Zoning board members may feel a bit 
uncomfortable thinking seriously about how to facilitate proper 
parenting.  If we can convince cities that they have a role to play in 
what people see as the very heart of family law—child custody and 
divorce—then it is more likely that cities will embrace less direct 
means of influencing families.  This “core-out” strategy is not 
necessarily always better than a “peripheral-in” strategy where 
reformers start with zoning boards and playgrounds and only later 
seek to engage city councils in the regulation of divorce and 
parenting. Rather, the best strategy for engaging local governments in 
family law is likely a set of strategies—some aimed directly at zoning 
boards and school boards, others aimed at city councils. 
                                                                                                            
 103. See generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-
MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 129 (2009). But see Samuel J. Abrams & 
Morris P. Fiorina, “The Big Sort” That Wasn’t: A Skeptical Reexamination, 45 POL. 
SCI. & POL. 203, 203 (2012).  I do not mean to suggest that all, most, or even many 
cities will be homogeneous enough to push local family law reform.  Many cities may 
be as diverse as the states that they reside in, or more so, making it difficult to 
generate enough political will to create local family law ordinances. See Richard C. 
Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local 
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2550-51 (2006). 
 104. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 214; Justin R. Long, Democratic Education 
and Local School Governance, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 401, 438 (2014). 
 105. BAKER & GILLETTE, supra note 3, at 46. 
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B. Policy Experimentation 
One of the primary defenses of moving power to smaller political 
units is rooted in the benefits of policy experimentation.  “[I]t is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”106  This rationale is even stronger in the context of local 
versus state power.  Increasing the number of laboratories increases 
the number of experiments107 and thereby increases the likelihood 
that one experiment will succeed.  In addition to increasing the 
number of laboratories, devolving power to the local level also 
decreases the costs of failed experiments.  Local experiments are 
smaller.  Their failures will hurt fewer people, while their successes 
can be mirrored in other jurisdictions. 
A bit of Texas history suggests that some cities will innovate, and 
that this innovation can help promote legal reform.  In the 1970s 
almost every divorce decree in Texas gave the non-custodial parent 
“reasonable visitation.”108  This vague standard effectively gave the 
custodial parent the power to grant, regulate, or deny visitation.109  In 
1983, the legislature invited courts to establish local visitation 
guidelines.110  Although the legislature called upon local courts to 
experiment, it could have also called upon other local entities, 
including cities.111  The legislature’s invitation was largely ignored.112  
                                                                                                            
 106. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 107. See infra Part IV (discussing existing safeguards against too much 
experimentation). 
 108. Sampson, supra note 71, at 101. 
 109. Id.  This is perhaps a particularly poetic result.  The state effectively left the 
judge without guidance about how to decide visitation, and the judge then passed the 
buck and left the parents with the same unhelpfully vague standards. 
 110. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 1608, ch. 304, § 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1983; Acts 1983, 68th 
Leg., p. 1728, ch. 338, §, eff. Sept. 1, 1983. 
 111. In future work, I address the possibility of a judicial form of local family law—
that is, the possibility that groups of local trial court judges could develop shared 
public norms that act as rules of thumb among those judges.  Although some recent 
literature attempts to bring local judges into the fold of local government, local 
judges exist within a state hierarchy and are not all beholden to local citizens in the 
same way that local governments are. See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory 
Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 924-25 (2013).  Accordingly, this judicial form 
of local family law merits separate treatment. 
 112. Sampson, supra note 71, at 110. 
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But a few local courts developed guidelines.113  The Travis County 
guidelines, for example, were particularly generous to the non-
custodial parent.114 
By 1989, legislators were frustrated by what they felt was the 
failure of judicial discretion and the failure of those judges to remedy 
the problem with guidelines.115  The legislature then retracted its 
invitation and developed its own guidelines.116  Most importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the legislature based its guidelines primarily 
on the ones that the local courts in Travis County developed.117  This 
suggests that even if only a few cities innovate, and even if the only 
vehicles for learning are casual observation, common sense, and the 
occasional argument generated by interest groups,118 local 
experimentation can be a valuable tool for legal reform. 
Today, municipal experiments are likely to be subject to multiple 
evaluations119 and successful experiments are even more likely to be 
mirrored in other jurisdictions.  Local bar associations that are 
considering reforming some aspect of family law routinely canvas the 
practices of other local bars.120  Additionally, numerous associations 
and research organizations have the express mission of evaluating 
experiments and spreading successful ones.  For example, The 
National Center for State Courts conducts its own research on the 
                                                                                                            
 113. Id. at 110. 
 114. See id. at 111, 114. 
 115. Id. at 110. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 111-12. 
 118. See id. at 97 (arguing that most changes to the Texas family code were the 
result of lobbying by, for example, the Texas Family Law Foundation and fathers’ 
rights groups). 
 119. People can learn from policy experiments even if there is no consensus on the 
proper standard against which to judge the outcome.  An organization could, for 
example, evaluate local alimony formulas by asking whether more cases settle in 
areas with local alimony formulas, whether lawyers report that alimony formulas 
make those settlements less acrimonious, and whether divorced couples are more 
satisfied with (or bring fewer appeals to) the result of their cases under some 
formulas compared to others.  These evaluations avoid thorny questions about the 
normative foundation of alimony. 
 120. Charles F. Vuotto Jr., Editor-in-Chief Column: Alimony Trends, 33 N.J. FAM. 
LAW. 6, 12 (2012); N.M. JUDICIAL EDUC. CTR., ET AL., NEW MEXICO FAMILY LAW 
MANUAL 4 (2011) [hereinafter NM Family Law Manual]; see also Judith Resnik, 
Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1629 (2006) (noting that “state jurists 
have a long history of interjurisdictional consultation—reviewing the experiences of 
their sibling states as they shape legal rules.”). 
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effectiveness of different states’ approaches to family law issues121 
and serves as a clearinghouse for a broad set of other research.122  The 
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges creates and 
publicizes model court practices and provides judicial training on 
topics like implicit bias, domestic violence, and elder abuse.123  The 
Center for Court Innovation conducts and distributes research about 
a host of local experiments in New York State.124  These associations 
and research organizations help ensure that cities that want to learn 
from the experiences of other cities will be able to do so. 
Although the virtues of policy experimentation rely on some 
degree of learning, an anemic version of learning can still be 
beneficial.  Even if no consensus emerges on which policies are 
reasonable and which transgress important boundaries, local 
experimentation can highlight the plasticity of family law’s open-
ended standards and the many ways in which reasonable people can 
disagree about how to implement them.  In this way, policy 
experimentation can lead to the exact opposite of a single-best 
solution; it can lead to the acknowledgment that there is no clear 
answer to the relevant policy question.  This too is a benefit of policy 
                                                                                                            
 121. See, e.g., NORA SYDOW & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, STRATEGIES FOR 
EFFECTIVE STATEWIDE JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 
(2010) (surveying twenty-one states with judicial commissions that focus on child 
welfare). 
 122. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/About-us.aspx. 
[https://perma.cc/4P3S-KTVN]. 
 123. Nat’l Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/about.  It has also gathered best practices when it comes to 
setting retroactive child support. NCJFCJ, A Practice Guide: Making Child Support 
Orders Realistic and Enforceable (2005), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/
NCJFCJ%20Bench%20Cards.pdf (discussing, for example, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts’s attempts to reduce default judgments, and evidence regarding the 
correlation between the length of retroactive child support and the probability that 
the obligor will pay it). 
 124. For example, they run a program in King County, New York that offers help 
to obligors in child support arrearages, and are actively working to establish similar 
programs in other jurisdictions. CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, PARENT SUPPORT 
PROGRAM (2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/parent-support-program-
helps-repair-parent-child-relationships.  They also evaluated an experiment in Nassau 
County, New York in which high conflict cases were identified early and custody 
issues were resolved before financial issues. Michelle Zeitler & Samantha Moore, 
Children Come First: A Process Evaluation of the Nassau County Model (2008), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/children-come-first-process-evaluation-
nassau-county-model-custody-part. 
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experimentation.125  It helps clarify the malleable nature of the values 
at stake. 
C. Political Entrepreneurship 
In addition to creating policy experiments, local government can 
serve as a platform for political entrepreneurship.126  Here, the goal is 
not necessarily to find better policy solutions to a given problem, but 
instead to serve as a gadfly to stimulate state legislatures to debate 
issues that they might otherwise prefer to avoid (although the two will 
often go together). 
Cities are particularly well situated to spur debate.  Cities have an 
existing base of democratic legitimacy and an insider status that 
makes them hard to ignore.127  San Francisco’s issuance of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples provides a good example.  Although San 
Francisco’s actions were quickly overturned,128 they led to an 
eventual victory in the California Supreme Court, a defeat at the 
polls, and a victory at the U.S. Supreme Court.129  Similarly, San 
Diego would assuredly cause a commotion if it asserted its authority 
to require residents to live separate and apart before divorcing130 or if 
it declared that relocating to northern California is presumptively not 
in children’s best interests.131  Alternatively, cities might enact 
                                                                                                            
 125. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 
933-34 (2011) (rejecting the idea that policy experimentation must lead to a single 
best solution and noting the virtues of informing and publicizing the relevant 
debates). 
 126. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2007); see also 
Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an 
Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 350 (2011); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007). 
 127. Some local bar associations have attempted to create local rules of thumb in 
the context of alimony, but judges sometimes ignore them because bar associations 
lack the authority to do so. Ramsay v. Wheeler-Ramsay, 232 P.3d 1249, 1258 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
 128. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 463-64 (Cal. 2004). 
 129. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 130. Currently, living separate and apart is not required for a divorce under 
California law, although it is relevant to determining when the marital relationship 
ended for purposes of community property and spousal support. See generally In re 
Marriage of Manfer, 144 Cal. App. 4th 925 (2006); In re Marriage of Hardin, 38 Cal. 
App. 4th 448 (1995). 
 131. Although all states use a best interests analysis for relocation, they vary 
greatly in terms of the details such as who has the burden of proof. Merle H. Weiner, 
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different alimony formulas.  Denver might equalize the ex-spouses’ 
incomes for some period following divorce.132 While Boulder might 
transfer much less money, perhaps because they focus on ensuring 
only that the ex-spouse’s minimum needs are met.  These differing 
formulas are likely to trigger debate at the state level and perhaps 
even at the national level. 
Entrepreneurship (and experimentation) might be valued even 
more highly if they draw on the experiences of, and give voice to, 
groups who are marginalized at higher levels of government.  For 
example, there are a number of majority-minority cities.  In over 1000 
cities, a majority of the residents are black.133 There are over 800 
majority-Latino cities, and 7 majority-Asian cities.134 Of course, 
whether those groups are well-represented on the relevant city 
councils is a different and important question.135  But these majority-
minority cities highlight at least the potential for localism in family 
law to reveal voices that are drowned out at the state and national 
level. 
D. Participation 
One traditional justification for local power is that it promotes 
heightened civic participation.136  Because one’s voice is more 
powerful in smaller political units, people may be more likely to 
participate in local politics.137  Local participation also builds a sense 
of community that perhaps can only exist in political units that cover 
a relatively small geographic area.138 
                                                                                                            
Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes Over Parental Relocation, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747, 1754-56 (2007). For general discussions of the debates 
surrounding relocation, see Sally Adams, Avoiding Round Two: the Inadequacy of 
Current Relocation Laws and a Proposed Solution, 43 FAM. L.Q. 181 (2009) and 
ATKINSON, supra note 32 at § 4-26. 
 132. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2227, 2229, 2258-61 (1994) (advocating equalizing household standards of 
living with alimony payments until the youngest child leaves the home and a certain 
number of years has passed). 
 133. Paru Shah & Melissa Marschall, The Centrality of Racial and Ethnic Politics 
in American Cities and Towns, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF URB. POL. 314 (2012). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 317-26. 
 136. See generally GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999). 
 137. Diller, supra note 126, at 1128. 
 138. Id. 
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Some local government scholars have questioned whether local 
power actually contributes to communitarian goals in practice.139  
Many people care predominately if not solely about national 
politics.140  Even if people wanted to care about local laws, the 
increased mobility of the population increases the costs of getting 
involved in local government and decreases the resulting benefits. 
Yet if any subject can reinvigorate the communitarian benefits of 
local government, it is family law.  Of all the things that local 
government might do, local family law is among the most accessible 
and important to the public.  Few areas of law are as close to the 
heart as family law.  Almost everyone who is affected by an alimony 
order (whether the obligor or the obligee or the new spouse of either) 
has an opinion about alimony law.  Almost everyone who has known 
someone involved in a custody dispute will have opinions on how to 
best balance the liberty of the parents against the welfare of the 
children.  If cities began to enact local family law, it is likely that 
many citizens would weigh in and would do so vigorously.141 
E. Sorting 
A classic argument for local power asserts that people will sort 
themselves into areas that fit their preferences.142  Greater municipal 
control leads to more variety among municipalities, which allows a 
tighter fit between municipal policy and citizen preferences.143 
Efficient sorting provides a weak argument for local laws 
surrounding family dissolution.  There are at least four barriers to 
selecting one’s home based on divorce laws.  First, people rarely know 
the content of divorce laws before they consult a lawyer about a 
divorce.144  Second, people are notoriously optimistic about their own 
                                                                                                            
 139. Id. at 1130. 
 140. David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council 
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 421-25 (2007). 
 141. See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and 
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1886-87 (2004) (arguing that 
courts should allow local citizens the freedom to negotiate norms surrounding the 
forms of government-sponsored religious expression that are acceptable). 
 142. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956). 
 143. There is some evidence that this type of sorting occurs. Vicki Been, “Exit” as 
a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 520-21 (1991). 
 144. See generally Lynn Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is 
Above Average, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993); Baker, supra note 38, at 367. 
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marriages.  Most refuse to acknowledge that they might someday 
divorce.145  Third, even if they manage to overcome this over-
optimism, other factors—such as job opportunities and schools—are 
likely to be far weightier factors in choosing a home.  Fourth, if 
people have sufficient foresight to plan for divorce, then in most cases 
they would be much better off negotiating a prenup or a postnup than 
relying on local law.146 
Even where efficient sorting is plausibly relevant to an analysis of 
local divorce law, its impact is likely to be small.  When a couple’s 
preferences are aligned, there are some instances where they might 
sort themselves based on local divorce law.  Prenups and postnups 
cannot control all aspects of divorce law; most notably, they cannot 
control child custody.147  Parents who wanted to precommit 
themselves to a particular custody arrangement might move to a city 
with laws that make this arrangement more probable.  Nonetheless, 
the obstacles to efficient sorting based on divorce law are 
significant.148 
As Professor Richard Briffault rightly observes, it is possible that 
people will inadvertently sort themselves into their preferred divorce 
regime.149 This might happen if their preferences about divorce 
correlate with the preferences about other amenities that localities 
may offer.  For example, people who prefer densely populated areas 
might also tend to prefer certain rules of thumb on divorce.  Or 
people who want to live in “blue” or “red” areas might favor certain 
rules of thumb over others.  This is certainly possible. But I know of 
no data, and I have no strong intuitions, that would bear on the 
                                                                                                            
 145. Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-
Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 733, 757-59 (2009). 
 146. This suggests that uniform treatment of prenups and postnups might be a 
counterweight to any residual problems of forum shopping and races to the bottom. 
Consistent with the themes of this Article, family law needs to be disaggregated to 
understand the costs and benefits of local family law. Although local variation might 
be a net positive for many areas of family law, prenups and postnups merit more 
centralization. Leib, supra note 111, at 924-25 (noting that the virtue of uniformity 
plays out differently for different laws, and arguing that uniformity is particularly 
important for contract law). 
 147. Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 3 (amended 2001), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). 
 148. This mitigates one classic problem with sorting, which occurs when localities 
design their amenities to repel low-income citizens. Richard Briffault, Beyond City 
and Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 203, 206 (2006). 
 149. Richard Briffault, On Family Law Localism: A Comment on Sean Hannon 
Williams’s “Sex in the City,” 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1175, 1183 (2016). 
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consistency and strength of these potential correlations.  So I remain 
hesitant to claim that local family law will generate efficient sorting. 
*       *       * 
Although it is unclear whether local family law can capture the 
benefits of sorting, it can open up avenues for much-needed policy 
experimentation, facilitate political entrepreneurship, and has the 
potential to reinvigorate citizen engagement with local politics. 
III.  POWER AND PREEMPTION: THE CASE FOR LOCAL RULES OF 
THUMB 
If state legislators are convinced by the arguments in Part II, then 
they could authorize local family law in several ways.  They could, for 
example, set up special Family Law Boards or regional entities with 
power to experiment with family law reform.150  But if states desire 
this type of experimentation, it is unclear why they would create 
entities from scratch. They might instead simply empower existing 
entities like city governments.151  But it is not clear how receptive 
state legislators will be to localist reforms of this sort.  As discussed 
above, all states use multifactor tests that grant trial judges a great 
deal of discretion and thwart meaningful efforts at providing 
uniformity and predictability.152  Again, these tests reflect, at least in 
part, political paralysis at the state level.  Given the stubborn stability 
of state laws in this area, it is important to explore reforms that do not 
depend on state action.153 
This Part addresses the potential for cities to use their home rule 
authority to influence family law without an explicit grant of authority 
from the state.  It examines a set of doctrines designed to demarcate 
                                                                                                            
 150. This Article does not take a position on these possibilities.  For more detailed 
discussions, see generally Williams, Local Voice, supra note 18. 
 151. Non-local forms of experimental family law could also be worthwhile.  
Suppose political parties adopted varying guidelines and judges from each party 
applied their respective guidelines.  This would create experimentation, participation, 
and allow for political entrepreneurship.  This type of experimentation, however, 
would not benefit from the deeply ingrained tendency in America to respect 
geographic forms of variation.  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1990) (“Localism as a value is deeply embedded in the American legal and 
political culture.”). 
 152. See supra Part I.A. 
 153. Of course, delegating decisions to cities reduces some of the pressures that 
cause stalemate at the state level.  For example, such delegation does not require that 
state legislators take positions on the substance of family law, but risk-averse state 
interest groups may still cause state-level paralysis. 
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the boundary between state and local authority.  Ultimately, this 
examination reveals that cities may have more power over family 
affairs than commonly assumed.  More specifically, there is a 
surprisingly strong argument that at least some cities can currently 
enact one form of local family law: local rules of thumb.154  This 
section fleshes out that argument.  Because of the large amount of 
diversity between states, this section paints with a broad brush.  Its 
goal is to show that there is a good chance that at least some cities in 
some states can currently implement local family law rules of thumb. 
Without explicit authorization, local legislative involvement in 
family law faces two obstacles: power and preemption.  Do home rule 
grants of authority include the power to initiate regulation regarding 
family law?  If so, would such regulation be preempted by existing 
state law that outlines a list of non-exclusive factors that courts must 
consider when determining custody, property division, and alimony?  
This Part speaks directly to cities when it argues that existing home 
rule doctrines provide them with the power to initiate local family 
law; it speaks to appellate courts when it argues that existing state 
statutes do not preempt many forms of local family law. 
Although both power and preemption create obstacles for local 
family law, preemption causes more serious concern.155  Existing 
preemption doctrines create one horn of a dilemma.  How can 
municipalities regulate subtly enough to avoid preemption (the first 
horn) while impacting judicial decisions enough to make their actions 
worthwhile (the second horn)? Perhaps surprisingly, even if 
preemption is at its strongest, local ordinances can have a profound 
effect on family law. 
                                                                                                            
 154. Rules of thumb exert influence only in those cases where judges are already 
uncertain.  They guide judges toward one outcome within the set that the judge has 
already determined represent a reasonable range of outcomes. SCHAUER, supra note 
20, at 108-09. 
 155. The general trend in state courts is toward allowing more local power. 
Richard Briffault, Local Leadership and National Issues, in PAPERS FROM THE 
ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN COLLOQUIUM AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, WHY THE LOCAL 
MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 67, 72 (2008) 
(“[I]t is fair to say that the scope of local initiative has grown and courts have been 
willing to sustain local power to act with respect to a host of matters not clearly or 
uniquely local.”); see also SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ANTIEAU] (“Some courts have 
indicated that while a broad topic may be of statewide concern, nevertheless, 
particular aspects—because of their paramount local concern—should be subject to 
local controls.”). 
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Many scholars have argued that the various tests for initiative 
power and preemption offer limited guidance and that courts are 
simply making their own ad hoc policy determinations.156  This 
suggests that the policy discussion of Part II should carry great 
weight.  The remainder of this Part, however, takes doctrine 
seriously—perhaps more seriously than it deserves—and asks 
whether family law is a matter of mixed or local concern that can 
survive preemption. 
The short answer is yes.  Despite the common trope that family law 
is a matter of state concern, many aspects of it are also matters of 
local concern. Although family law statutes are comprehensive, the 
large space they leave open for judicial discretion also creates a space 
for local ordinances to weigh in on how judges ought to exercise that 
discretion.  Even if such ordinances would be preempted in some 
states, cities certainly have the power to merely ask that judges 
consider local judgments.  A great deal of evidence suggests that even 
this latter form of local family law, which has no formal teeth 
whatsoever, is likely to greatly influence the large number of judges 
who are actively seeking guidance in exercising their paralyzingly 
broad discretion. 
A. Power: State and Local Matters 
Many grants of home rule authority include all initiative powers 
not specifically denied by the state.157  For these states, there is no 
serious question of whether municipalities have the power to initiate 
ordinances that regulate the family.158  Rather, the question is one of 
preemption, which will be discussed in the next Subpart.  This 
Subpart focuses on those states that grant municipalities initiative 
                                                                                                            
 156. Diller, supra note 126, at 1116, 1140-41 (describing intrastate preemption 
doctrines as unhelpful and judicial applications of these doctrines as inconsistent); 
Briffault, Local Leadership, supra note 155, at 76 (“Most courts in most states most 
of the time [treat preemption] as a question of legislative intent, which is resolved in a 
multifactored relatively ad hoc inquiry.”); Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1344, 
1350 (2009) (describing the term “local affairs” as notoriously ambiguous, and 
collecting cases supporting the claim that courts are making ad hoc judgments about 
its scope); see also Briffault, Local Leadership, supra note 155, at 72 (“No 
constitutional formula can determine what courts will actually do in contested 
cases.”). 
 157. These are “legislative” home rule states. ANTIEAU, supra note 155 at § 21.01. 
 158. Id. at § 21.06. 
2016] SEX IN THE CITY 1137 
 
power only over “local” issues or “municipal affairs,”159 and argues 
that many family law issues are matters of both state and local 
concern. 
Courts have been unable to produce a satisfactory test to 
determine the line between state and local issues.160  This is perhaps 
because few if any issues are entirely the concern of only one level of 
government; nothing is only local or only relevant to the state.161  But 
three common touchstones have emerged to draw the line between 
local and state power: the need for legal uniformity, the possibility 
that local law will create externalities, and the historical balance of 
power between state and local authorities.162 
The possibility of disuniformity and externalities are by far the 
most important factors.163  Lynn Baker and Dan Rodriguez offer a 
fourth possible touchstone.  They suggest that state court judges are 
conducting ad hoc determinations of institutional competence.164  
Some issues, when viewed within their particular temporal and 
political context, might be better decided at the local level than the 
state level.  Overall, courts tend to interpret home rule grants 
generously to allow cities to legislate even when an issue is a mixed 
matter of state and local concern.165 
Although marriage may not be a local concern, divorce is.  The 
conventional wisdom is that family law is solely a matter of state 
concern.166  This conventional wisdom reflects an overgeneralization. 
                                                                                                            
 159. Id. at § 21.05. These are “imperio” home rule states. Id. at § 21.01. 
 160. Id. at § 21.05. 
 161. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the 
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 623-25 (2001) (discussing federal power under the 
Commerce Clause and arguing that the terms “truly local” and “truly national” are 
descriptively inaccurate). 
 162. Baker & Rodriquez, supra note 156, at 1351. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1353-54 (arguing that uniformity and externalities are often pretexts for 
a larger concern about institutional competence). 
 165. ANTIEAU, supra note 155, at § 21.04, § 21.06; Diller, supra note 126, at 1127 
(noting that there is now widespread acknowledgement that many issues are of mixed 
state and local concern, in which case municipalities have the power to legislate); see 
also Richard Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 91, at 264 (“There should be a broad 
presumption of local power to act on matters that affect the locality or the people 
within it.  This is central to the basic democratic, decentralizing, innovative thrust of 
home rule.”). 
 166. Schragger, supra note 5, at 150-53. 
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Determining who can marry may be a state issue,167 but determining 
who can access benefits because of marriage-like relationships can be 
a mixed state and local issue.168  More importantly, determining who 
can marry and adjudicating disputes upon divorce look quite different 
when viewed in light of touchstones for delineating state and local 
concerns—uniformity, externalities, history, and institutional 
competence.  Three of the four touchstones for local power favor 
local family law.  The only impediment is history. 
1. History 
Historically, the balance of power between state and local 
governments has tipped decisively in favor of states within the context 
of family law.169 State law controls divorce; state law controls 
paternity; state law controls abuse and neglect standards.  However, 
past inaction is not a strong reason to support future inaction,170 
especially when the instrumentalist touchstones—uniformity, 
externalities, and institutional competence—each support local family 
law. 
2. Uniformity 
The context of divorce turns the traditional arguments about 
uniformity on their head.  Traditionally, uniformity favors state rather 
than local control.  Uniformity is generally considered a virtue 
because it reduces the costs of learning and complying with multiple 
laws in multiple jurisdictions and ensures that like cases are treated 
alike.171  But when the state delegates broad powers to individual 
judges with minimal appellate review, the state is effectively creating 
widespread disuniformity.  Allowing localities to influence family law 
decisions can increase rather than decrease uniformity.  This is 
                                                                                                            
 167. Compare id. (arguing that the case against local control over marriage law is 
weak), with Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 471 (Cal. 2004) 
(“[T]here can be no question but that marriage is a matter of statewide concern 
rather than a municipal affair, and that state statutes dealing with marriage prevail 
over any conflicting local charter provision, ordinance, or practice.”). 
 168. See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 955, 974-76 (2012). 
 169. H. MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 673-74 
(1916). 
 170. Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 
20 UCLA L. REV. 671, 703 (1973). 
 171. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2008). 
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clearest for large cities that contain several judges within their 
borders.  Local family law can also promote uniformity even when a 
single judge (often elected at the county level or in larger districts) 
hears cases involving the residents of multiple towns.172 
In big cities, multiple judges often hear divorce cases.  Those judges 
may differ wildly in their proclivities.  Local rules of thumb could help 
align their rulings, which would promote predictability and horizontal 
equity.  Houston judges may still differ from Dallas judges, but at 
least there will be more consistency within cities, and their respective 
residents will not be subject to an outcome-determinative city-level 
lottery of which judge gets assigned to their divorce case. 
Local family law will not always promote uniformity, even in big 
cities. Family law must be disaggregated into its component parts.  If, 
for example, there is a strong judicial norm against deviating from the 
child support guidelines even though judges have wide discretion to 
do so, then local family law could disrupt this norm-driven uniformity.  
By and large, however, the best data we have suggests that 
disuniformity is the norm in many areas of family law, including 
property division, alimony, and many issues within the rubric of child 
custody.173  In these areas, local family law can drastically increase 
uniformity.  Even in those places where local family law decreases 
uniformity, the standardly cited costs of this disuniformity are likely 
to be low in the context of family law.  The major cost of 
disuniformity cited in debates about the boundary between matters of 
local and state concern is that it creates compliance costs when it 
forces people or businesses to know and adapt to different laws in 
different jurisdictions.  But this compliance cost aspect of 
disuniformity is largely irrelevant in the area of family law.  People 
have very little knowledge of family law.174  They do not seek to know 
their state’s divorce law (a least not until they are on the brink of 
divorce), and it is very unlikely that they research family law when 
they consider where to move.  This ignorance of family law prevents 
                                                                                                            
 172. See, e.g., Texas District Court Map, http://www.txcourts.gov/media/914401/
District-Court-Map-Sept-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6EF-2C8B]. 
 173. See supra Part I. 
 174. Baker & Emery, supra note 144. 
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people from incurring the costs of learning about local family law175 
and adjusting their behavior to accommodate local variation.176 
Outside of the big cities, judges may have jurisdiction over an 
entire county or a larger district, and that area may contain two or 
more small cities.177  Those cities might develop competing rules of 
thumb.  Although this may appear problematic at first blush, it is not.  
Without local family law, these judges will have no focal points and 
no advice to help resolve many family law issues.  With local family 
law, they now have two suggested rules of thumb.  This is an 
improvement.  Uniformity will increase if, rather than choosing 
among a world of options, judges gravitate toward one of the two 
focal points, even if they randomly choose which rule of thumb to 
follow.  But judges are unlikely to choose randomly.  They are much 
more likely to take the advice that they decide is better, or as I will 
discuss in the next Part,178 to apply City A’s rule of thumb to its 
residents and apply City B’s rule of thumb to its residents.  This 
should be no more objectionable that the same judge applying City 
A’s zoning ordinances to its residents and City B’s zoning ordinances 
to its residents.  Our federalist system embraces such geographic 
variation. 
3. Externalities 
The classic examples of externality-creating laws are “not in my 
backyard” ordinances preventing landfills, sex offenders, or other 
perceived threats from locating within a city.179  Such laws shift those 
                                                                                                            
 175. Ignorance of family law may also be a positive good because it helps prevent 
people from strategically altering their behavior to gain an advantage once a divorce 
occurs. 
 176. Sometimes businesses have an interest in family law matters.  Closely held 
corporations, hedge funds, and other businesses sometimes wish to insulate 
themselves from the turmoil that a divorce might cause. See Brooke Masters, 
‘Postnup’ Boom Among Hedge Fund Managers, FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2007), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a6499b80-0eee-11dc-b444-000b5df10621 [https://perma.cc/
VS3E-GC2W].  Although these entities might incur costs researching divorce law, 
they are already forced to use prenups and postnups rather than rely on any 
particular state’s default divorce law regime.  As long as local family law does not 
create variation in the enforceability of prenups and postnups, the businesses that are 
most directly affected by divorce law will not suffer compliance costs from 
disuniformity. 
 177. See, e.g., Texas District Court Map, supra note 172. 
 178. See infra Part IV.A. 
 179. Diller, supra note 126, at 1160. 
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threats to other cities.  These kinds of externalities are not present in 
local family law. 
The closest family law comes to creating externalities occurs when 
a judge determines the rights of a couple who subsequently move to 
another city.  The new city would have to live with the results of the 
first city’s family law.  Yet there are two reasons to think that this will 
not be problematic.  First, this is not generally seen as a problem in 
the interstate context.  In fact, various laws ensure that an original 
divorce decision is enforced even when people move to a new state 
that might have differing policy preferences about how to handle that 
divorce.180  In the intrastate context, the same preference for finality 
should prevail over a preference for each new city to re-litigate the 
divorce.  Second, local family law does make the externality problem 
worse than it already is.  Currently, when a divorced person moves to 
a new city, that city has to live with the effects of an individual judge’s 
determination of what custody and property arrangements were best.  
Local family law simply attempts to ensure that this initial 
determination is more informed and more consistent.  If anything, 
local family law alleviates externality concerns because it makes 
family law much more public.  Armed with this new information, 
cities may begin to examine whether family law is creating externality 
problems.  If they decide those problems exist, they could then seek 
reforms at the state level.  This is all far preferable to the hidden 
idiosyncratic family law system we currently have. 
Professor Briffault is especially worried about externalities in part 
because he envisions a world in which people are governed by the 
laws of the locality in which they divorced regardless of where they 
subsequently move.181  But that is not how family law currently 
operates, and local family law does not alter this.  There are some 
aspects of an initial divorce decree that are not modifiable.  Other 
cities may have to live with the consequences of these determinations, 
but as discussed in the previous paragraph, local family law does not 
exacerbate these concerns.  Other aspects of an initial divorce decree 
are modifiable—like alimony, child support, and child custody.  
Various rules determine which court is vested with this power to 
modify.  That is, various rules determine when the original judge 
                                                                                                            
 180. Nat’l Comm. of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 201 (UCCJEA); NCCUSL, 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 205 (UIFSA). 
 181. See Briffault, On Family Law Localism, supra note 149, at 1180-81. 
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keeps jurisdiction and when jurisdiction transfers to a new judge (for 
example, when the child moves to a new area).182  New judges 
exercise their own independent judgments about those aspects of a 
divorce judgment that can be modified, at least when there has been a 
“material and substantial” change in circumstances.183  Local family 
law does not change any of this.  All it does it offer the judge advice if 
she decides that modification is warranted. 
4. Institutional Competence 
Insofar as the proper way to navigate the state-local divide is by 
analyzing institutional competence, there are reasons to embrace 
local family law.  Both people and judges are divided on many family 
law issues.  For example, they may disagree about whether to award 
alimony, how much to award, and for how long.  This implies that 
there is a wide range of acceptable answers to the questions that 
alimony poses.  Fundamentally, alimony decisions are value 
judgments about the degree to which spouses, by virtue of their 
wedding vows, have ongoing responsibilities toward one another even 
after the marriage ends.  Allowing local law to influence this aspect of 
divorce allows alimony law to better reflect community values.184  
Similarly, local laws can ensure that community values influence the 
complex tradeoffs implicated in other family law decisions. 
The particular way that states have distributed power over family 
law matters is also relevant to assessments of institutional 
competence.  The choice is not actually between state and local 
control; it is between local control and control by an individual judge.  
The local legislative process offers advantages over judicial fiat as the 
proper way to adopt value-laden policy.  The former allows for more 
community involvement, deliberation, and debate, and more 
effectively ensures that like cases are treated alike. 
                                                                                                            
 182. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.201(b) (West 2016) (governing intrastate 
moves); UCCJEA §201(a)-(b) (governing interstate moves). 
 183. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.057 (West 2016).  Of course, there are 
some constraints. Id. (allowing downward but not upward modifications of spousal 
maintenance). 
 184. Schragger, supra note 5, at 161 (“[P]ublic assertions of moral values are more 
appropriately made at the local level.”); cf. Jason Solomon, The Political Puzzle of 
the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1377-78 (2012) (noting the limits of a 
geographically-bounded conception of “community”). 
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5. The Private Law Exception and State-Local Partnerships 
Even if all of the above factors favor local family law, one 
traditional limitation might prevent it.  The so-called private law 
exception prevents municipalities from legislating with respect to 
“private and civil affairs” including contract law, property law, and 
tort law.185  Ultimately, Professor Briffault and I agree that the 
private law exception makes the “question of local power . . . far from 
open and shut.”186 But there are reasons to be optimistic that at least 
some courts in some states will allow the private law exception to 
peacefully coexist with local family law rules of thumb. 
The role of municipalities in tort law illuminates the scope of the 
private law exception.  One can be liable in tort if one does not 
exercise reasonable care.187  But what is reasonable care?  This is an 
open-ended inquiry.188  Although municipalities have no direct 
control over setting this standard of care, state court judges can and 
do look to municipal codes to help define what is reasonable in that 
particular municipality.189  Similarly, state court judges use local 
zoning laws to help define actions that constitute a nuisance.190  Other 
areas of tort law also embrace state-local partnerships. In most states 
that recognize negligence per se, the violation of either a state statute 
or a city ordinance carries this same consequence.191  In each of these 
cases, local law is being used to understand the definition of 
reasonableness within state law.192  The fact that state courts embrace 
this interpretive structure for tort law suggests that similarly 
                                                                                                            
 185. Schwartz, supra note 170, at 671.  This exception, however, does not prevent 
cities from altering property rights through zoning or contract rights through the 
regulation of gambling. Id. at 690-91. 
 186. Briffault, On Family Law Localism, supra note 149, at 1180. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010) 
 188. Id. 
 189. Schwartz, supra note 170, at 704. 
 190. Id. at 706. 
 191. Id. at 704; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a (2010). 
 192. Local law can also more directly refine state law. C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 14.38, at 14-109 (1997 & Supp. 2000) (noting the 
permissible sweep of “[r]efinements of detail which are reasonably related to 
differing local conditions and which are consistent with the broad parameters of the 
state law”); Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1464 (2001) (detailing ways that cities can “refine” state crimes 
by, for example, adding forfeiture and even altering mens rea requirements). 
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structured local family law would not run afoul of the private law 
exception. 
B. Preemption: The First Horn of the Dilemma 
One home rule scholar has noted that “[i]t seems safe to conclude 
that as for both the administration of wills and the law of divorce, 
legislation in almost every state has preempted the field.”193  But this 
statement may be too broad.  State law may not completely occupy 
the field of divorce law and may not conflict with many powerful 
municipal actions.  State law requires judges to consider many factors 
when making a host of family law decisions.  Normally, these lengthy 
lists of factors end with an open-ended one that invites judges to 
consider any other relevant factor.194  This invitation opens up a space 
for local involvement in family law. 
Intrastate preemption comes in two flavors: express and implied.195  
Because state statutes that control alimony, child custody, and other 
family law matters do not contain express provisions preempting local 
law, this section will focus on implied preemption.  Intrastate implied 
preemption doctrine distinguishes between conflict and field 
preemption.196  There are several tests for conflict preemption.  Some 
states ask whether a local law prohibits an act permitted by the state 
or permits an act prohibited by the state.197  If so, then the local law is 
preempted.198  Other states allow local law to be more stringent than 
state law but not less.199  For example, a city could require a higher 
minimum wage that state law provides for, but not a lower one.200  
Courts frequently treat field preemption like conflict preemption and 
ask whether the local law frustrates the purpose of the state law.201 
Even if courts apply the above tests formalistically—which is highly 
unlikely—some forms of local family law have a good chance of 
surviving preemption.  Consider two scenarios that would present 
                                                                                                            
 193. Schwartz, supra note 170, at 692. 
 194. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West 2016). 
 195. Diller, supra note 126, at 1141.  Most states have a form of implied 
preemption, and some states recognize only express preemption. Id. at 1141, 1157. 
 196. Id. Although, of course, there are numerous subtle variations. 
 197. Id. at 1142. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1152. 
 200. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1155 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
 201. Diller, supra note 126, at 1155-57, 1168. 
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relatively easy preemption questions.  One law might mandate that 
state court judges use a particular alimony formula or mandate that 
they prevent parents from entertaining overnight guests when the 
child is present.  Either law would be preempted because it is 
inconsistent with the legislative purpose of granting trial courts 
discretion.  Another law might merely encourage judges to consider a 
particular alimony formula or encourage a particular stance on 
expressions of parental sexuality.  This law would not be preempted.  
It is just a suggestion; it does not prohibit or permit anything and it is 
doubtful that a judge could find any legislative intent to prevent 
interested parties (including local governments) from making 
suggestions about what factors might be relevant to family law 
determinations.  Although this law only creates a suggestion, it may 
have more influence than one might expect.  I will discuss this 
possibility in the next section. 
Consider a harder scenario, where a local law requires judges to 
consider an alimony formula or a local stance on vaccination as one 
relevant factor, but does not purport to make the local judgment 
presumptively correct.  This law has a good chance of passing the 
various preemption tests, even if they are applied formalistically.  For 
state laws that explicitly allow courts to consider any relevant factor, 
the question becomes: who is authorized to determine whether a 
factor is “relevant”?  Is it only the judge, or local governments as 
well?202  If a multifactor state statute is silent on the issue, then under 
conflict preemption, courts might apply a permit/prohibit test.  The 
state law could be read to permit a judge to ignore local factors, while 
this law prohibits a judge from ignoring them.  Under this analysis, 
the local law would be preempted.  If the court instead asks whether 
the local law is more stringent than state law, it could survive conflict 
preemption.  This law is more stringent than state law because it 
requires judges to do something more than state law required, just as 
Santa Fe could require businesses to pay a higher minimum wage 
than state law required.203  This law is also likely to survive field 
preemption.  To determine whether field preemption would preclude 
this law, we must derive the legislative purpose of multifactor family 
law statutes and ask whether this law would substantially interfere 
                                                                                                            
 202. There is a traditional prohibition on cities interfering with judicial 
administration by, for example, adjusting judicial salaries, procedure, election rules, 
or filing fees. ANTIEAU, supra note 155, at § 22.17.  But these would not prevent cities 
from influencing substantive law. See supra Part III.A.5. 
 203. New Mexicans for Free Enter., 126 P.3d at 1155. 
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with that purpose.204  The purpose would appear to be to provide 
some guidance to courts (by listing factors), but to allow the trial 
court to make the ultimate decision about the weight of those factors 
in an individual case.  This ordinance does not substantially interfere 
with that purpose.  Rather, it is consistent with it because it offers 
guidance in the traditional form of listing factors, but does not 
impinge upon the judge’s ultimate discretion. 
Once we combine policy rationales with the formalistic preemption 
tests, a law that requires a judge to consider a particular local factor 
should survive preemption challenges with relative ease.  Even if 
some appellate courts would declare that such a law was preempted, 
the milder form of local family law—where cities merely make 
suggestions to state judges—would assuredly survive. 
C. Impact: The Second Horn of the Dilemma 
The two forms of local family law that can survive preemption 
might at first appear weak.  One merely requires judges to consider a 
local factor, while the other only suggests that they do so.  
Nonetheless, a surprising number of judges are likely to be influenced 
by local advice even under the weaker of these two versions of local 
family law.  Both forms of local family law create rules of thumb.205  
They exert influence only in cases where the judge is uncertain about 
the proper outcome.206  However, uncertainty is the norm in these 
determinations.207 
Judges crave guidance when implementing the broad discretion 
that family law provides them.  Judges may have an intuition that 
children are harmed when a parent publically displays affection 
toward a new sexual partner.  They may also have the opposite 
intuition: that children are harmed when parents fail to publically 
display affection toward their new sexual partners.  Regardless, many 
judges want something more than just their intuition to go on.  
Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery have argued that judges rely too 
heavily on undertrained custody evaluators and other pseudo-
psychologists.208  They do so precisely because they are reaching out 
                                                                                                            
 204. Diller, supra note 126, at 1155-57, 1168. 
 205. SCHAUER, supra note 20, at 108-109. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See supra Part I.A. 
 208. Scott & Emery, supra note 71, at 92-93; see also Leslie Eaton, For Arbiters in 
Custody Battles, Wide Power and Little Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, 
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for something more than their own intuitions.  Above all, judges want 
competent advice.209 
The advice that judges seek can come from various sources.  When 
the relevant question relates to whether a child is psychologically 
harmed by a parent’s sexual behavior,210 then judges seek the advice 
of people who purport to understand child psychology.  When 
questions of value are relevant, they should turn to institutions that 
have the proper democratic pedigree to make those value judgments: 
such as local governments.211 
Given the extremely broad discretion that judges are burdened 
with, they are likely to take any reasonable advice.  There is ample 
evidence to support this.  Recent experiments have focused on 
alimony formulas.  These sources of formulaic advice provide a good 
test case for whether judges are likely to be influenced by even the 
weakest form of local family law. 
                                                                                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/nyregion/for-arbiters-in-custody-battles-wide-
power-and-little-scrutiny.html (reporting that judges routinely rely on unqualified 
“expert” custody evaluators). 
 209. Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Child Custody Evaluations: The Need 
for Systems-Level Outcome Assessments, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 286, 287 (2009) (“Many 
reasonable, but anecdotal, reports indicate that judges find custody cases to be 
difficult and frustrating and that they turn to mental health professionals for 
assistance.”). 
 210. This is the relevant question under the majority “nexus” test. Kim, supra note 
12, at 17. 
 211. Of course, I do not claim that city councils have an impeccable democratic 
pedigree; local governments are not free from all political pathologies and do not 
necessarily accurately represent the preferences of their constituents.  Currently, city 
councils are elected to conduct rather mundane city business (for example, to make 
sure trash is collected on time) rather than to make value judgments about divorce 
policy.  So right now, it is unclear whether city councils would accurately reflect the 
preferences of the electorate on family law issues.  But of course, electorates adapt.  
If voters learn that city councils influence divorce law then they will take this into 
account when they vote.  Further, city councils often have a much stronger 
democratic pedigree than judges who face minimal election pressure. Brian Arbour 
& Mark McKenzie, Has the “New Style” of Judicial Campaigning Reached Lower 
Court Elections?, 93 JUDICATURE 150, 151 (2010); Michael Nelson, Uncontested and 
Unaccountable-Rates of Contestation in Trial Court Elections, 94 JUDICATURE 208, 
209 (2010) (noting that “‘voter ignorance, apathy, and incapacity’ are the norm in 
judicial elections”).  Regardless of the actual democratic responsiveness of city 
councils, people are likely to ascribe more legitimacy to enacted local family law.  
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 151, at 1.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
there may be benefits to municipal family law that is unresponsive to local 
preferences.  Such laws would reduce selection effects that otherwise hinder the 
assessment of social policy. Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, 
Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 931, 952-53 (2011). 
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The available evidence overwhelmingly shows that judges are 
highly influenced by available alimony formulas.212  The majority of 
judges in Michigan use the results of a popular attorney-generated 
alimony formula as a factor to consider in determining alimony, and 
some use the formula’s results as the presumptively correct amount of 
alimony.213  Colorado legislators appear to agree that advisory 
formulas will influence outcomes. They recently enacted a complex 
series of alimony formulas that address both the duration and amount 
of alimony.214  However, these formulas are not binding.215  Judges 
merely have to make the relevant computations.216  After that, they 
have complete discretion to set both the duration and amount of 
alimony.  Assuming that legislators in Colorado did not intend to 
waste their own time, it is likely that many of them thought that even 
merely advisory formulas could have a great impact.217 
The Canadian experience with spousal support guidelines provides 
further evidence that nonbinding advice can have a profound impact 
on decisions.  With a grant from the Canadian Department of Justice, 
two Canadian professors developed advisory spousal support 
guidelines in 2005.218  These guidelines produced ranges of spousal 
support amounts.219  Judges have discretion both within these ranges, 
and to deviate from them entirely.220  No legislature has voted on 
                                                                                                            
 212. There is also evidence that legal actors seek similar formulaic justice in other 
areas of law. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 
571, 609 (2012) (discussing judicial efforts in mass tort cases to try representative 
cases and extrapolate to other cases without having additional trials); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 805-807 (2011) 
(identifying settlement mills where formulas create going rates for various classes of 
cases). 
 213. State Bar of Michigan, Standing Committee on Justice Initiatives, Equal 
Access Initiative Alimony Guidelines Project, Alimony Guidelines Survey Report 4 
(2011). 
 214. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-114 (West 2016). 
 215. Id. § 14-10-114(3)(e). 
 216. Id. § 14-10-114(3)(a). 
 217. Outside the context of alimony, a judge struggling with the best interest test 
might welcome a local ordinance that weighs in on helicopter parenting.  Similarly, a 
judge may look to local law in cases where she is unsure of whether to divide marital 
property equally.  Local law can provide much-needed guidance to judges in the 
many instances where consideration of the state’s multiple factors leaves the judge 
unsure of what to do. 
 218. Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, The Canadian Experiment with Spousal 
Support Guidelines, 45 FAM. L.Q. 241, 241-45 (2011). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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these guidelines and they only purport to be advisory.221  Nonetheless, 
they have received support from appellate courts and are now widely 
used.222  The major complaint as of 2011 was that lawyers and judges 
rely too heavily on the guidelines and stick to the guideline range 
even in cases where a deviation might be justified.223  The Canadian 
experience provides another reason to believe that even merely 
advisory guidelines can have a significant impact.224 
Regardless of whether local advice comes in the form of rules of 
thumb for custody determinations or advisory formulas for alimony 
determinations, judges are likely to embrace such advice.  In each 
case, judges face decisions that they are ill equipped to handle.  City 
councils, by contrast, better represent local community values and are 
in a much better position to resolve the innumerable value questions 
that arise in family law matters.  City councils are also in a better 
position to gather data (rather than relying solely on the parties and 
issues that happen to come before a court) and make rules of thumb 
that are undergirded by both value judgments and more objective 
determinations such as whether free range parenting harms 
                                                                                                            
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. The veneer of mathematical precision that alimony formulas provide is 
likely to make them even more appealing.  For discussions of this phenomenon in 
cost-benefit analysis, see Michael Livermore & Richard Revesz, Retaking Rationality 
Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) and Wendy Wagner et al., 
Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 295 (2010).  For a related discussion about child support see 
Ellman, supra note 71, at 185 (“[T]he fact that the [original child support] guideline 
always produces an exact support amount, down to the penny, gives an impression of 
scientific certainty.  Users see this precise number, not all the questionable 
assumptions that go into producing it.  Repeated reliance on the numbers produced 
by the existing guidelines creates a powerful anchor effect in the minds of users, who 
come to assume they are the correct answer.”). 
 224. The Canadian experience might lead a reader to think that advisory guidelines 
will have too much influence rather than too little.  But judges will still be able to 
reject or moderate abjectly unreasonable local guidelines.  We do not know precisely 
why Canadian judges follow the guidelines closely.  But it seems reasonable to 
conclude that they do so because they view them as reasonable estimators of alimony.  
Insofar as local experiments stay within a band of reasonableness, this type of judicial 
deference to the guideline has numerous benefits.  If and when local experiments 
transgress the admittedly fuzzy boundaries of reasonableness—for example, if a city’s 
formula leaves the obligee with significantly more income than the obligor, or if it 
leaves the obligee in poverty—local judges are unlikely to apply it mechanically. 
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children,225 and, if so, whether any such harm is outweighed by the 
liberty interests of the parents themselves. 
*       *       * 
A surprisingly strong case can be made that cities currently have 
the power to create local rules of thumb, and that those advisory rules 
can survive preemption in at least some states.  But even if cities do 
not currently have this power or if courts interpret their preemption 
doctrines to stop this form of local influence, state legislatures could 
still affirmatively authorize cities to enact local rules of thumb.  Doing 
so has the potential to create significant benefits.  The next Part 
addresses the cost side of the equation, and suggests that local rules of 
thumb largely avoid a series of objections commonly lodged against 
local power. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS 
Although local law comes with a number of well-explored pitfalls, 
they either are unlikely to manifest themselves in the context of local 
rules of thumb, or they can be dealt with rather easily.  This Part 
briefly discusses seven potential pitfalls and provides an initial 
defense of local rules of thumb against these possible objections.226  
First, local rules of thumb might lead to races to the bottom, where 
competition for residents leads cities to adopt laws that deviate from 
their true policy preferences.227 Second, spouses might have the 
capacity to forum shop when filing for divorce, and parents might 
have a similar capacity when they file suits regarding custody and 
child support.228  Third and fourth, local rules of thumb could create 
externalities or disuniformity.  Fifth and sixth, councilmembers may 
                                                                                                            
 225. David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is 
Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 949 
(2012) (“‘Free Range’ parenting [is] rooted in the philosophy that children can and 
should be given greater responsibility and autonomy at young ages and that the 
perceived risks that prompt overprotective parenting are overblown.”).  There are 
value judgments imbedded in the determination of whether free-range parenting 
creates harms, such as how much and what types of harm to consider.  There are also 
more objective elements, such as whether children experience stress as measured by, 
for example, cortisone levels. 
 226. I leave for another day a defense of local family law more broadly, although 
some discussions in this Subpart have implications beyond rules of thumb. 
 227. Diller, supra note 126, at 1132. 
 228. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) 
(calling for a more nuanced understanding of forum shopping, which is generally seen 
as an evil). 
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enact systematically bad or oppressive policies.  Seventh, local family 
law may provide a platform for divisive political posturing on hot-
button issues. 
None of these concerns appear to present a serious challenge to 
local rules of thumb.  Although the following discussion is 
preliminary, it should go a long way toward assuaging the fears of 
skeptical readers and convincing them that local rules of thumb have 
sufficiently robust built-in protections that they are worthy of serious 
consideration. 
A. Races to the Bottom 
Races to the bottom are very unlikely to occur in the context of 
local family law, for some of the same reasons that local family law 
will not capture the benefits of efficient sorting.  People rarely know 
the law, refuse to acknowledge that they might split up, are 
constrained in their ability to move based on local law, and would be 
better off with a prenup or a postnup in the unlikely event that they 
wanted to plan for divorce.229  Additionally, because many aspects of 
family law are zero-sum games—like alimony, property division, and 
physical custody—moving to a particular jurisdiction will usually be a 
benefit to one spouse and a detriment to another.230  Finally, races to 
the bottom require that mobile agents have homogeneous 
preferences, which is unlikely to describe people’s preferences for 
family law.  In the classic race to the bottom, a government might 
lower taxes or decrease regulation to attract more business.  As a 
general rule all businesses want the same thing—to increase profits—
and this often takes the form of wanting lower taxes and less 
regulation.  This homogeneity is crucial to creating races to the 
bottom; if many businesses wanted high taxes, then areas with high 
tax rates would still attract businesses.  Heterogeneity, not 
homogeneity, is the rule in the context of family law.  A city that 
expresses a preference for two-parent households is likely to repel a 
great deal of potential residents at the same time that it attracts 
others.  This will prevent races to the bottom. 
                                                                                                            
 229. See supra Part II.D. 
 230. These are only roughly zero-sum games.  For example, through creative 
reallocation of resources a couple may be able to avoid taxes and thereby increase 
the size of the marital estate. 
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B. Forum Shopping 
Variation among local rules of thumb increases the potential for 
forum shopping, but substantial barriers remain.  Currently, forum 
shopping is possible, but requires moving to a new state.  Moving to 
the suburbs, or moving from one suburb to another, is often far easier 
than moving to a new state.  Accordingly, we should expect more 
forum shopping under a system of local family law.  But perhaps not 
much more. 
There are substantial costs associated with forum shopping even at 
the local level.  Standard state venue rules tie venue to residence.231  
Most spouses are not free to move to a favorable city.  It may be 
particularly difficult to convince your spouse to relocate during a 
period in which there is most likely some marital strife.  If the couple 
has school-aged children, a forum-shopping spouse may also have to 
convince his partner to transfer the kids to a new school. 
Even in a situation where one spouse can convince the other to 
move, forum shopping is a manageable problem.  Because trial court 
judges retain discretion to deviate from local advice, they could easily 
police opportunistic behavior by following the advice of the couple’s 
original city.  Further, when dividing marital property in an equitable 
manner or considering each spouse’s parenting abilities, judges are 
unlikely to look kindly on a spouse who was willing to uproot his or 
her family at great monetary and emotional expense just to obtain the 
possibility of a more favorable venue. 
C. Externalities and Uniformity 
Part III.A has already argued that local rules of thumb create 
neither externalities nor disuniformity.  Although I will not repeat the 
full discussion here, it is worth briefly reiterating the previous 
discussion on uniformity.  The context of divorce turns the traditional 
arguments about uniformity on their head.  Traditionally, uniformity 
favors state rather than local control.  But when the state delegates 
broad powers to individual judges with minimal appellate review, the 
state is effectively creating widespread disuniformity.  Moving family 
law to the local level would often increase rather than decrease 
uniformity. 
One potential complication with this argument cleaves apart actual 
and perceived uniformity.  Local family law increases actual 
                                                                                                            
 231. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 166 (2016). 
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uniformity in part by helping to align the decisions of multiple 
judges.232  But by making family law outcomes more predictable and 
more public, local family law highlights a different form of 
disuniformity: disuniformity across cities.  However, there are strong 
reasons to suspect that people will see municipal variation as 
legitimate.  Local family law must be judged within the larger context 
of our federal system, which openly embraces unequal treatment 
across state lines.233  We generally do not see this as unfair or as 
undermining the legitimacy of the law.234  Local law creates similar 
variation.  Possessing a six inch knife may be a crime in one city but 
not another.235  Similarly, many people would agree that cities can 
legitimately differ about what degree of public nudity is acceptable.  
Here, just as in local family law, local citizens have the opportunity to 
create laws that reflect their local preferences.  The fact that local 
laws result from local democratic processes may help explain why this 
form of variation is generally not seen as unfair or a significant 
violation of the principle that like cases should be treated alike.236 
Even if the costs of disuniformity are higher than I argued above, 
those costs must still be balanced against the other virtues of local 
rules.  Disuniformity may be a price that is worth paying for increased 
policy experimentation, more avenues of political entrepreneurship, 
and renewed citizen engagement with local politics.237 
D. Oppressive or Bad Policies 
The power to influence families is the power to both help them 
flourish and hinder that flourishing.  Accordingly, any reform 
proposal that creates more power for local government needs to 
address possible constraints on that power.  Local rules of thumb are 
already subject to robust constraints that limit their incompetent or 
nefarious uses. 
Before outlining those constraints, one clarification is in order.  
These constraints do not eviscerate the benefits of localism.  As 
                                                                                                            
 232. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 233. Frost, supra note 171, at 1594-95. 
 234. Id. at 1594-95.  The term “legitimacy” here refers to its moral and sociological 
dimensions. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1794 (2005). 
 235. Logan, supra note at 192, at 1430 (discussing local criminal law). 
 236. See Frost, supra note 171, at 1595-96. 
 237. See id. at 1581 (arguing that uniformity must be balanced against other 
values). 
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illustrated above, many of the benefits of localism can be achieved 
even if only a single locality innovates.238  The set of constraints 
described below prevents the floodgates from opening but still allows 
a trickle of experimentation, and this is a prudent first step down the 
novel path of local family law. 
Municipal experimentation with child custody rules of thumb is 
likely to be particularly controversial.239  Many people might be 
concerned that city ordinances will require courts to consider the 
local majority opinion that gay parents are generally worse than 
straight parents, or that married parents are generally better than 
unmarried parents.240  People may also worry about local 
discrimination based on the parents’ religiosity (or lack thereof), 
parenting styles, or even their practice of punishment and 
discipline.241 
The examples above invoke fears that cities will oppress local 
minorities or might be particularly prone to enacting bad policy.  
There are three important features of the types of local rules of 
thumb described here that substantially mitigate each of these 
potential problems.  First, the zero-sum structure of most divorce and 
child custody actions drastically reduces the ability of city 
councilmembers to discriminate against families as a whole.  Second, 
the possibility of state level override helps prevent the harms that 
objectionable local ordinances could create.  Third, and more 
importantly, local rules of thumb are advisory only. 
Because physical custody, alimony, property division, and child 
support are largely zero-sum games, it is very difficult to discriminate 
                                                                                                            
 238. See supra Part II.B. 
 239. Of course, one can imagine nefarious uses of local power in the realm of 
property division and alimony as well.  If people with high incomes control local 
politics, then we might expect local family law to protect those individuals by 
adopting stingy alimony formulas and glosses on equitable distribution that favor the 
higher earner. 
 240. Not everyone shares these worries.  In the context of religious oppression, 
Richard Schragger has argued that cities today are less likely to oppress local 
minorities and therefore should be supervised less closely by courts. Schragger, The 
Role of the Local, supra note 141, at 1820-21. 
 241. Similar worries emerge in regards to local prosecutors and local judges in tort 
cases. Pimentel, supra note 225, at 947-49; Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the 
Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533, 533-34 (2013); Conor 
Friedersdorf, Working Mom Arrested for Letting Her 9-Year-Old Play Alone at 
Park, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 15, 2014), at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2014/07/arrested-for-letting-a-9-year-old-play-at-the-park-alone/374436/ 
[https://perma.cc/FNR6-D4SQ]. 
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against the family as a whole.  Any discrimination would simply shift 
power from one family member to another.  If one spouse gets more 
money, the other gets less.  If one parent gets more time with the 
child, the other gets less.  This makes divorce and custody actions 
particularly ill-suited for discriminating against the family as a 
whole.242  Of course, these zero-sum structures do not hinder attempts 
to discriminate against one member of a couple and in favor of the 
other.  But this form of discrimination faces other barriers. 
The possibility of state level override reduces the likelihood that 
local law will be oppressive or idiotic.  Interest groups can seek a state 
statute that limits local power generally or rejects the particular city 
ordinance at issue.243  Of course, I do not want to suggest that all 
oppressed local minorities have effective state lobbying groups.  But 
state legislatures have already revealed their preference for open-
ended standards.  This suggests that they might be particularly 
receptive to using their preemption authority against cities that try to 
guide judicial discretion.  State supreme courts may also be willing to 
police egregious ordinances.244  These state-level overrides, or just the 
looming threat of them, reduce the likelihood that local family law 
will become oppressive or reflect bad policy choices. 
Most importantly, these objections are drastically weakened by the 
modesty of local rules of thumb.  City councils cannot mandate an 
outcome.  They can only require a judge to consider a locally enacted 
                                                                                                            
 242. Of course, this does not mean that one cannot harm families as a whole even 
within a zero-sum game.  Allowing children to see one of their parents live in luxury 
while the other wallows in poverty may cause those children substantial emotional 
distress.  But this example suggests that this will be the exception rather than the rule.  
Giving all assets or all parenting responsibilities to one parent may be harmful to 
children, but judges strongly prefer middle ground, and it is unlikely that evil 
councilmembers could convince them to take such extreme positions.  Evil 
councilmembers could also try to use child support against families.  They could favor 
high child support awards for especially low income men, thereby perpetuating a 
cycle of punishment for non-payment.  Because the child support is unlikely to be 
collected, the evil councilmember could hurt one family member without necessarily 
helping the other one.  But child support is the least discretionary of family law’s 
standards.  Local influence is at its weakest here. 
 243. Paul Diller makes a similar point while arguing that very little harm would 
result if states abandoned the private law exception to local law. Paul A. Diller, The 
City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2012). 
 244. Appellate courts are much more likely to police city councils than individual 
judges.  Policing individual judges under the current system requires intense 
engagement with the facts of particular cases, because those judges are vested with 
such wide discretion.  Policing city councils only requires deciding whether an explicit 
policy statement laid out in an ordinance violates some statewide policy. 
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factor.  This creates an important check on local power.  Two 
institutional actors must agree before local policy affects individuals.  
Consider a municipality that tries to stamp out helicopter parenting 
by advising judges that helicopter parents should generally not obtain 
custody.  Judges may well take this into account, but no local minority 
can be burdened by this law without a judge agreeing that helicopter 
parenting is harmful in a particular case.  Helicopter parenting is 
perhaps an unlikely target.  Homosexual parents, adulterous parents, 
and interracial parents are more likely to be targeted.245  But again, 
municipalities must convince a judge that their policies are sound.  
And there are reasons to think that those two actors will maintain a 
good degree of independence from one another.246  This creates 
barriers to local oppression.  Similarly, bad policy choices are less 
likely to affect actual litigants because both the municipality and the 
relevant judges have to agree that the policy is in fact reasonable.247 
Some skeptics may be particularly worried cities will discriminate 
against minorities who have been the traditional targets of 
oppression.  But city councils face significant hurdles to doing so.  
Legislatures face almost impenetrable hurdles to expressly using race, 
sex, or religion to define a set of persons who should receive special 
treatment.248  They cannot use race without triggering strict 
                                                                                                            
 245. Of course, constitutional limits may prevent judges from following some local 
policies. 
 246. Although Ethan Leib has attempted to conceptualize local judges as local 
officials, they are state officials and exist within a state judicial hierarchy. Leib, supra 
note 111, at 924-25.  Although technically elected in many states, trial court judges 
face notoriously little pressure from the electorate. Arbour & McKenzie, supra note 
2111, at 151.  Even if trial court judges were more responsive to the electorate, judges 
would often (although not always) be accountable to a different set of voters than the 
ones that city councilmembers will be accountable to.  Judges are often elected at the 
county level, while towns and cities do not always respect those lines. See, e.g., 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._municipalities_in_multiple_counties 
[https://perma.cc/26ZC-4Z5L]. 
 247. This also reduces the likelihood that local influence in the form of formulas or 
rules of thumb will hurt the exceptional cases most. Engstrom, supra note 212, at 850. 
 248. This stands in interesting contrast to the scant barriers between local 
minorities and judicial oppression. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 
847, 868-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (arguing judges are free to give race as much weight 
as they want, as long as race does not trump all other factors combined); Katie Eyer, 
Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538, 542 (2014) 
(noting that the Court has “repeatedly declined invitations to” police family law’s use 
of race “based at least in part on the Court’s race conservatives’ perception that the 
remaining uses of race in family law were simply ‘different’ and, at least in some 
circumstances, ‘benign.’”); see also Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 283, 281 P.3d 115, 
120 (2012) (“Additionally, the preference for the mother as custodian over the father 
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scrutiny.249  They cannot use sex without triggering intermediate 
scrutiny.250  They cannot use religion without running afoul of the 
Establishment clause.251  Even if courts held that furthering the best 
interests of children was a sufficiently weighty interest in these cases, 
family law already provides individualized hearings.  Thus, any 
suspect generalizations embedded in ordinances will not be 
sufficiently tailored to pass any form of heightened scrutiny.252  
Ordinances would not be able to say that the lighter skinned member 
of an interracial couple should get custody, or that mothers should get 
custody,253 or that the Christian member of an interfaith couple 
should get custody,254 or that custody should generally go to the 
parent who attends religious services on Sunday (as opposed to 
                                                                                                            
of a child of ‘tender years’ is considered only where all other considerations are found 
to be equal.”).  One should also be cautious about assuming that lawyers—and by 
extension, judges—will generally be more “enlightened” then city councilmembers. 
Michael Miller, Tenn. Judge Refuses to Grant Straight Couple Divorce Because . . .  
Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2015/09/04/tenn-judge-refuses-to-grant-straight-couple-a-divorce-
because-of-gay-marriage/?utm_term=.ff2211af36dd. 
 249. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978). 
 250. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (condemning the use of “overbroad 
generalizations” rooted in sex, and applying intermediate scrutiny to such 
classifications). 
 251. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 666 (2006) (noting that favoring one religion for purposes of 
child custody would “pressure parents to participate in religious practice or to profess 
religious belief” in order to bolster their chance of obtaining custody); see Craig, 429 
U.S. at 198 (noting that the state cannot discriminate against nonbelievers either). 
 252. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (holding that there is no need to use sex 
as a proxy for need when the relevant statutory scheme already provides for an 
individualized hearing that could address need). 
 253. Several state courts have held the tender years presumption unconstitutional. 
Ex parte Evine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 
178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 
1986). Similar doctrines would likely fail constitutional inquiry. Dalin v. Dalin, 512 
N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D. 1994) (“We agree that if the trial court assumed that fathers, 
as a group, are incapable of adequately raising their daughters, it would be relying on 
an improper factor to determine custody.  Trial courts should not ‘perpetuate the 
damaging stereotype that a mother’s role is one of caregiver, and the father’s role is 
that of an apathetic, irresponsible, or unfit parent’” (citation omitted)). But see Clair 
v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 283, 281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012) (“Additionally, the preference 
for the mother as custodian over the father of a child of ‘tender years’ is considered 
only where all other considerations are found to be equal.”). 
 254. 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND NOWAK’S 
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.3(a) (“any denominational preference 
violates the establishment clause unless the government can demonstrate that the law 
is necessary to promote a compelling interest.”). 
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Saturday or non-attendance).255  They would also not be able to say 
that African American couples should pay higher filing fees or that 
Muslim families should be barred from using collaborative divorce.  
Although the constitutional limits on singling out same-sex couples 
may be in flux, both Obergefell v. Hodges256 and existing state 
doctrines create significant barriers to oppressing gays and lesbians.  
That evolving set of doctrines strongly suggest that local ordinances 
could not, for example, recommend that gay parents should have to 
submit to more invasive custody evaluations,257 or that custody should 
generally go to the parent who currently embraces heterosexuality.258 
E. Posturing 
One final objection is, ironically, rooted in the many safeguards 
that area already built into local rules of thumb.  If city 
councilmembers know that judges will ignore or moderate their 
ordinances, they might feel more emboldened to posture and make 
broad pronouncements on hot-button issues.259  These overly-bold 
policy statements might then degrade public debate and fuel an us vs. 
them mentality that exacerbates existing rifts within a state’s 
population. 
But there are reasons to doubt this dire prediction.  First, as 
discussed in the previous section, constitutional constraints 
significantly reduce the number of floats in this parade of horribles: 
Local family law rules of thumb could not use race, sex, religion, or 
sexual orientation to define benefitted groups.  Second, if the state-
                                                                                                            
 255. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992). 
 256. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 257. An ordinance that singled out gays and lesbians for more intrusive processes 
upon divorce would have “the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in 
important respects;” it would “demean” them; it would “disrespect and subordinate 
them;” and it would cause their “children [to] suffer the stigma of knowing their 
families are somehow lesser.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600, 2601-02, 
2604 (2015).  These effects make such a local ordinance constitutionally suspect. 
 258. Before judges can rely on a parent’s sexuality or sexual orientation to set 
custody or visitation, most states require them to explicitly articulate a nexus between 
parental actions and specific harms to the child.  Nexus tests arose in cases where one 
biological parent subsequently came out as gay.  Their goal was to eradicate the 
influence of general sentiments like “exposure to homosexual behavior is generally 
harmful to children” or “gay parents generally cannot provide a stable home 
environment for children.”  For more background on nexus tests, see WEISBERG & 
APPLETON, supra note 52, at 703.  For a critique of nexus tests, see Kim, supra note 
12, at 20. 
 259. See Briffault, On Family Law Localism, supra note 149, at 1185. 
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wide expressive impact of a city’s ordinance is correlated with that 
city’s population (which seems likely), then posturing has another 
built in constraint.  Posturing also has political costs.  If the issue is 
truly a “hot-button” one, then the councilmember’s own constituents 
are likely to pay attention to the expressive impact of the ordinance.  
Others are too.  Cities that posture risk losing tourism or convention 
revenue.  Some cities won’t have these problems.  Councilmembers 
could easily posture in a small town that is not dependent on tourism, 
where the vast majority of the population agrees with the expressive 
force behind the bold posturing.  But again, this posturing might not 
have much impact on the state-wide stage.  Of course, it is possible 
that this might fuel an us vs. them mentality.  But it is worth 
considering the possibility that the reverse is may occur.  Although 
many issues generate distinct red and blue positions, it might be that 
family law is not among them.  We might be surprised by the ways 
that positions on family law sometimes do and sometimes do not 
follow red and blue scripts.  Therefore, local family law might serve to 
problematize some us vs. them logics even if it might promote others.  
Overall, the constraints to posturing, combined with the fact that 
division is not its inevitable result, significantly weaken this objection. 
*       *       * 
The above discussion is too brief to assuage all fears; it is not meant 
to.260  Rather, it suggests that one should not dismiss local family law 
out of hand.  There are a surprisingly large number of safeguards 
already built into local rules of thumb.  This constrained capacity to 
harm stands in stark contrast to the widespread and important 
benefits that localism can provide in this area.  This should make 
readers question any initial skepticism they may have had and to be 
more open to localism within family law. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this Article, I introduced a radical idea: that 
localities could have a say in policy matters at the very heart of family 
law.  At this point in the Article that idea should no longer look 
radical.  Rather, it should look plausible, and perhaps even plainly 
preferable to the current system. 
Local family law rules of thumb have the potential to revolutionize 
family law by disrupting its long-entrenched distribution of power 
                                                                                                            
 260. For a fuller discussion, see Williams, Local Voice, supra note 18. 
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where states have nominal control over family law, but delegate the 
real decision-making authority to individual judges.  This disruption 
can accomplish what decades of reform efforts have failed to do: push 
family law away from frustratingly indeterminate standards and 
toward predictable rules. 
Adding a local voice to family law promotes uniformity, facilitates 
policy experiments, creates avenues for political entrepreneurship, 
and is perhaps uniquely capable of reinvigorating civic engagement 
with local politics.  Properly structured, local family law can likely 
accomplish all of this without creating a serious risk of races to the 
bottom, forum shopping, externalities, or minority oppression. 
Of course, no one can predict exactly what will happen if cities 
accept my invitation for local innovation.  But the numerous 
constraints built into local rules of thumb suggest that states and 
academics should at the very least tolerate the addition of this local 
voice. 
Local rules of thumb are also a useful gateway to more robust 
municipal engagement with family policy.  Weighing in on child 
custody or divorce matters has high expressive value, but costs no 
money.  Its low monetary stakes can make it an appealing first step.  
If councilmembers come to believe that they can do good in this area, 
they might then be more likely to invest money in pre-K programs, 
nurse-partnerships, parks, or any other project that helps children 
thrive. 
As local experimentation develops, it could help clarify the 
respective roles of the state and federal government as well.  One 
might imagine state and local legislatures settling into the following 
roles.  States would determine the broad policy goals of family-
oriented policy—such as finding the custody arrangement that is in 
the child’s best interest—while also creating boundaries within which 
local experimentation can occur.  For example, the state could set up 
two visitation orders that reflect a range of aggregate visitation times; 
orders that fall within this range might be presumptively in the child’s 
best interests.  Local law would then have its impact within this range, 
that is, within the boundaries for experimentation set by the state.261 
                                                                                                            
 261. This basic model—providing a bounded space for local autonomy and 
experimentation—closely tracks other arguments for the respective roles of 
individual freedom, state family law, and federal family law. Anne C. Dailey, 
Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (1995); Stark, supra note 78, 
at 1479.  One could also imagine a more proactive state that embraced democratic 
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Local rules of thumb also open up important conversations about 
the role of the federal government in family policy.  Several scholars 
have argued that the conventional narrative that family law is a 
matter of state concern devalues family law and obscures the 
importance of enforcing federal rights in the context of the family.262  
For these scholars, the prospect of making family law more local 
might signal an even greater devaluation of family law and a further 
weakening of constitutional rights in this area.263  But if anything, 
local family law will alleviate rather than exacerbate these concerns. 
Local family law will necessarily open up a public dialogue about 
the respective roles of both the city and the state.  In fact, the more 
outlandish and oppressive local law attempts to be, the more state 
legislators might then be motivated (and might have adequate 
political cover) to provide more guidance to family law judges or set 
up the appropriate boundaries within which local experimentation 
could take place.  This conversation expressly reinforces the idea that 
multiple levels of government are responsible for regulating the 
family.  The analogy to federal rights is hard to miss.  If the state can 
and should police the proper boundaries of local family law, then the 
federal government can and should police the proper boundaries of 
state family law.  This suggests that even those who favor greater 
federal oversight in family law matters could welcome the localism 
described in this Article. 
Cities are capable of revolutionizing family law.  This Article has 
taken the first steps toward assessing whether they should do so, and 
offers an optimistic view of local power.  Local family law rules of 
thumb have the potential to create an impressive confluence of low-
risk benefits, each of which could help families flourish. 
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 263. Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
537, 537-39 (2014); Courtney Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787 
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